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Abstract  
War-stricken and only a few years in existence, South Sudan is arguably one of the largest 
statebuilding-projects undertaken to date. The importance of local ownership in peacebuilding 
and statebuilding has been recognised for many years, but more often than not the term local 
ownership is used about national ownership. The areas outside the centre, the peripheries, 
receive only limited attention. Through a case study of Yei River County this thesis aims at 
assessing the implementation of statebuilding in the peripheries of South Sudan.  
To provide input to the analysis a great number of local chiefs, government officials and 
community members across the county have been interviewed. The findings presented in this 
thesis have been correlated with known literature on the subject and indicate that the state is 
failing in providing infrastructure, services, security and justice to its population, particularly 
in the peripheral areas of the county. Moreover, the accountability and knowledge of the 
system of local governance, both in the communities and among the players, appears limited. 
Based on the findings from Yei River County, this thesis argues that the implementation of 
statebuilding has not been successful in the peripheries of South Sudan. For this to change 
South Sudan needs a strong focus on the lower levels of governance.  
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1 Introduction: Yei River County, 
South Sudan in a historical and 
political context 
The importance of local ownership in developmental projects in general, and peacebuilding 
and statebuilding in particular has been recognised for many years. However, looking more 
deeply into the concept of local ownership I have come to realise that it more often than not is 
used about national ownership, with only limited focus on the areas outside the centre and the 
lower levels of government. Most statebuilding projects and research efforts are focused at the 
national level and primarily in the centre of the country. This disregard of local ownership 
creates great challenges in statebuilding efforts as one of the key features of a functioning 
state is the ability to control the peripheries.  
South Sudan is the world’s youngest state, and has been subject to numerous statebuilding 
initiatives since before the 2011 independence. This makes South Sudan a very suitable frame 
for investigating how successful the implementation of statebuilding has been in the 
peripheries of a post-conflict country. Seeking to find an answer to this question, I performed 
a qualitative case study of Yei River County, an area that has experienced relative peace for 
almost twenty years and consequently should be better suited for a successful implementation 
of statebuilding. 
This introductory Chapter 1 will place this case study of Yei River County in a historical and 
political context. Following this, the theoretical framework will be reviewed in Chapter 2, 
where key concepts such as statebuilding, peacebuilding and local ownership is defined and 
their relation to each other and to the case is discussed. In Chapter 3, I will focus on research 
design and methodology. There, I will present the methodological choices I have made, and 
the consequences of my choices on the reliability and validity of the thesis. I will also deal 
with challenges related to generalisation and reliability of a qualitative case study. This 
includes a longer discussion of the challenges of choosing to perform a fieldwork in a 
developing country and having to conduct most of the interviews with the use of an 
interpreter.  
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Having established the background and framework for the study, I will present my findings 
and analysis in Chapter 4. I compare my findings to secondary literature, and discuss them in 
relation to the theoretical framework. In chapter 5, I will conclude on the consequences of my 
findings indicating that the implementation of statebuilding has not been successful in Yei 
River County, making the South Sudanese state a peripheral state in the peripheries. Lastly, I 
will recommend further research to learn more about statebuilding in South Sudan’s 
peripheries more widely, as well as the relationship between statebuilding and renewed 
conflict.  
1.1 The long and winding road to independence for 
South Sudan 
A number of historical and political events has affected the local-level power structures in 
South Sudan, and Yei River County is not an exception. Events at the national level and, more 
locally, to the Equatoria region and Yei River County itself, have had an impact on the current 
situation. With knowledge of these events, it is possible to analyse the implementation of 
statebuilding.  
Following a referendum held in January 2011 on secession from Sudan, the Republic of South 
Sudan was established on 9th of July the same year. From Sudan becoming independent in 
1956 to the independence of South Sudan in 2011, the region suffered two devastating civil 
wars causing immense human suffering, displacement of people and deaths. There exist no 
reliable figures to describe the cost of the civil wars and estimates vary greatly, with 
demographic data coming out of Sudan considered unreliable by many (Johnson 2003, 143).  
Similar to many other areas on the African continent (Chabal and Daloz 1999, 12), the British 
colonial rulers in South Sudan practiced indirect rule through local chiefs. However, the 
British did not find the same established system of traditional authorities such as chiefs, 
sultans or kings in the South as in the North, with the notable exception of the Shilluk and 
Azande kingdoms. The British were determined to practise what was termed native rule and 
decided to create these authorities (Johnson 2003, 12–13; Bakheit 1974, 27–28), appointing 
chiefs, often among ethnic groups that had no tradition for this form of rule. The chiefs not 
only acted as mediators between the colonial rulers and the people, but were also judges and 
tax collectors (Johnson 2003, 11–13; Leonardi 2013, 89–101; Leonardi 2007, 539–540; 
3 
 
Rolandsen 2005, 64–70). It is recognised that this system originated in the colonial era, but it 
was continued after Sudan’s independence in 1956 as a low-cost method of controlling areas 
remote of the state in the north (Leonardi 2007, 537–540; Leonardi 2013, 137–142).  
Fearful of Northern dominance upon independence, the Southerners voiced violent protests 
prior to the 1956 independence of Sudan. In early 1962 the first opposition party in exile, the 
Sudan African Closed Districts National Union (SACDNU) was formed, and subsequently 
changed its name to Sudan African National Union (SANU) (Rolandsen 2011b, 215). The 
summer of 1963 saw the forming of Anya-Nya, the military wing of SANU. A series of minor 
operations executed by Anya-Nya in the period between September 1963 and January 1964 
mark the beginning of the first Sudanese civil war (Rolandsen 2011b, 211–222), which did 
not end until the Addis Ababa agreement of 1972. The following relative peace lasted only 
eleven years, with the Second Civil war breaking out in 1983. Not all the actors in the South 
accepted the peace-agreement, and the conflict with the North was re-kindled in 1982. The 
guerrillas and southern officers joined forces, and by 1983, more and more police and soldiers 
had defected for the bush. By the end of 1983 the People’s Liberation Movement/Army 
(SPLM/A) was formed (Johnson 2003, 39–63). 
Following a series of internal controversy in SPLM/A throughout 1991-92, several senior 
commanders left the party. They formed the Nasir-fraction, a splinter group led by Riek 
Machar and Lam Akol, that competed with SPLM/A for support from the people and foreign 
assistance. As a reaction to this, SPLM announced in the spring of 1993 that it would hold a 
National Convention. The leadership of SPLM/A, however, claimed that the decision to hold 
the convention was made before the split. With the Nasir-fraction, the political controversy 
soon turned into a bloody war. The announcement of the National Convention may be seen as 
an attempt by the SPLM/A leadership to demonstrate its legitimacy and as a means to appear 
convincing to both South Sudanese and foreigners. Between the announcement of the 
National Convention and the actual date of the convention, the answer to what it was 
supposed to be changed many times. In the end the National Convention marked a political 
renewal through the announcement of a political programme and the intention of forming 
civilian institutions in the areas controlled by the SPLM/A (Rolandsen 2005, 35–40).  
In the aftermath of the National Convention, attempts were made to expand and reform the 
system of local government in SPLM/A controlled areas, resulting in a separation of the civil 
administration from the military. However, the extent to which this was successful varied 
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greatly (Rolandsen 2005, 158–159). The limited success might be a consequence of the 
process leading up to the convention and the shifts in objective of the convention. In addition 
to this, SPLM/A adopted the British strategy of using local chiefs and tribal leaders to collect 
taxes, maintain law and order, and serve as mediators between the population and the leaders, 
as well as to mobilise forces to the army (Leonardi 2007, 543; Johnson 2003, 148–150).   
The National Convention Resolutions from 1994 presented a general outline of the political 
and administrative systems at the lower levels, stating that the system at the national level 
should be replicated at the regional and local level (Rolandsen 2005, 158–159). In line with 
the resolutions, SPLM/A recognised the authority of “traditional” authorities in the shape of 
chiefs (Leonardi 2013, 181), but these government institutions were lacking in their capacity 
to perform state functions (Walraet 2013, 183–184). According to a consultancy report by 
Rohn, Adwok Nyaba, and Benjamin (1997) no proper legislation was set forth on local 
government and public administration. This left the local commissioners to organise and run 
their own counties, with the inevitable differences in practice. The lack of a uniform practice, 
together with the fact that both the regional and local level leaders were appointed by the 
central level, left the local and regional levels with little ability to check the power of the 
central level (Rolandsen 2005, 159). Such a lack of ability to check the power of higher levels 
of government is in conflict with the principles of bottom-up democratic control that will be 
discussed later on in this chapter.  
After years of negotiations, the Second Civil War ended 9th of January 2005 with the signing 
of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) (Holt and Daly 2011, 163–166). Before the 
CPA, the Machakos protocol of 2002 had laid an important foundation (Rolandsen 2011a), 
specifying a six year Interim Period where each side was to withdraw its forces from the 
other’s territory and instead form a joined armed unit. It is worth noting that a six month «pre-
interim period» was stipulated, making the day of independence for South Sudan in July 2011 
and not January. During the Interim Period, a new Government of Southern Sudan, commonly 
abbreviated to GoSS, was established as a semi-autonomous government. Power sharing at 
the centre, the national level, was an important part of the CPA and a new Government of 
National Unity was established to achieve this. General Omar al-Bashir and his National 
Congress Party kept the position as president of Sudan, while John Garang as leader of 
SPLM/A was appointed First Vice President. This made the power sharing in reality a power 
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sharing between the National Congress Party and the SPLM/A, leaving little room for non-
aligned southerners and the opposition in the north (Holt and Daly 2011, 163–164).  
John Garang was a strong advocate of the SPLM/A rhetoric for the New Sudan, a united 
Sudan revolutionised according to the goals of SPLM/A (Johnson 2003, 62–65; Holt and Daly 
2011, 152–153) and remained so even after the change in the political discussions to a more 
secessionist rhetoric after the National Convention (Rolandsen 2005, 143–149). By the time 
the Machakos negotiations were initiated in 2002, the SPLM/A leadership had much of their 
legitimacy based on their somewhat reluctant pursuit of self-determination for the South. 
(Rolandsen 2011a, 555–556). Garang was killed in a helicopter crash on 30th of July 2005, 
only three weeks after assuming office in Khartoum, and was succeeded by the current 
president of South Sudan, Salva Kiir, widely perceived as more positive to southern 
succession (Holt and Daly 2011, 164–165).  
During the Interim Period, and in some areas even before that, the GoSS started the process of 
establishing or developing state institutions to govern the autonomous region (de Vries 2013, 
153–155). In some of stable areas controlled by SPLM/A during the Second Civil War, such 
as the Yei region, the “guerrilla government” of SPLM/A reigned for years before the CPA 
was signed (Rolandsen 2005, 161–163; de Vries 2013, 154–155). In garrison towns such as 
Juba, which had been under the control of the Khartoum government, this was not the case. 
The SPLM/A and the Khartoum government institutions dated from different periods and 
were present in different areas of today’s South Sudan. During the Interim Period they needed 
to be consolidated to form new agencies under the Government of Southern Sudan, but 
following this process, the distribution of responsibilities between the different state 
institutions was unclear and caused confusion for actors within and outside the institutions (de 
Vries 2013, 161–162).   
1.2 The Current Political Situation in South Sudan  
After independence in 2011, South Sudan continued to face many of the same challenges as at 
the point of the signing of the CPA. The project of merging a common system for the areas 
that had been under different administration systems during the war, as well as the struggle to 
gain control had proved overwhelming to the southern government (Rolandsen 2015, 165). As 
a result, independent South Sudan became what de Waal (2014) describes as a kleptocracy, 
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i.e. a militarized, corrupt neo-patrimonial system of governance. The costs of the “political 
marketplace” had become so high that it hardly left any funds for public services, 
development or institution building. This dysfunctional system had wide-reaching 
consequences for the new country (de Waal 2014), and as many weak states before it (Käihkö 
2012, 181), South Sudan experienced political crisis.  
This political crisis should be seen in relation to South Sudan as a large beneficiary of 
international aid, with a large portion aimed at promoting good governance. South Sudan is 
one of the largest beneficiaries of Norwegian aid, ranking sixth in Norad’s annual report on 
Norwegian aid for 2014. 39 percent of this aid has been spent on the promotion of good 
governance, the majority of which has been focused on strengthening public administration 
and civil society (Norad 2014). A consultancy report from 2012 (Lacher 2012, 6–8) indicates 
that the decentralised administration and political structures created with donor support 
function mainly as instruments of patronage. The report indicates that the appointed leaders 
are prioritising accommodating political actors to stabilise their own vulnerable position. 
Funds that were supposed to be used to establish functioning institutions have instead been 
seeping into the patronage system. This is making South Sudan a natural part of the picture of 
the informalisation of politics painted by (Chabal and Daloz 1999, xx–xxi), where the 
patrimonial and infra-institutional ways of legitimising power still dominates.    
Even though both the CPA and the 2010 elections were seen to bring a shift in the 
competition for power and resources, the governance practices of the wartime continue to be 
upheld especially the military. At the same time, a local political class was emerging among 
the displaced people, struggling for societal control and access to resources. The key actors of 
the regulatory authority may be found again in other positions such as state officials, 
community leaders, military and businessmen (Walraet 2013, 186–187). Since the monetised 
economy of South Sudan is largely informal (Rolandsen et al. 2015, 89), the state has limited 
opportunity to raise taxes on markets and transactions and the knowledge of the sector is 
limited. In the South Sudan-Kenyan border areas, the road to financial success is paved with 
the history of military power in the area. The ones who had access to the centres of power 
during the war are the ones who continue to have economic opportunities today (Walraet 
2013, 186–187).  
In the late 1990s, the unified Sudan began producing oil, which soon became the dominant 
source of income for the country, constituting the majority of government revenues after the 
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independence. Fluctuating oil-prices have had a destabilising effect on the South Sudanese 
economy, a situation made worse by the continued disputes between the two Sudans over 
borders, fees for the use of the pipelines through Sudan and the distribution of oil revenues. 
As a response to a dispute with Sudan over oil transportation fees, South Sudan shut down 
production in early 2012, and it was not resumed until the spring of 2013. The production stop 
had a great impact on the South Sudanese economy (Patey 2014, 225–248). 
On 16 December 2013, the President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir Mayardit, announced on 
state television that he had stopped an attempted coup in the capital Juba. It was said that this 
attempted coup had been led by the former Vice-President Riek Machar and several ex- 
cabinet ministers and officials of the ruling SPLM. Over the next few days the commanders of 
the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity states 
announced their support for Machar and seized control over the state capitals of Bor, Bentiu 
and Malakal (Johnson 2014, 300–301; Rolandsen et al. 2015, 88–93). The consequences of 
the civil war has been devastating, and although it is difficult to determine the scale of the 
impact of the war, estimates say that the victims of direct fighting together with the indirect 
deaths from illness and malnutrition had reached 100, 000 by the end of 2014. UN estimates 
claim that as many as 1, 9 million people have been displaced by the conflict (Rolandsen et al. 
2015, 93).  
In the wake of the armed conflict, the already weak economy of South Sudan has suffered 
further. The revenues from oil production constitute the pillar of the formal economy and the 
reduction of production of nearly 30 percent hit the South Sudanese economy hard. Combined 
with the unwillingness of foreign investors to invest in a conflict zone and the falling oil 
prices of early 2015, the reduction in production has put South Sudan in an economic crisis. 
Any reserves that the government might have had are long gone and there is no sign of 
improvement as long as the current conflict continues (Rolandsen et al. 2015, 93). 
1.3 Local Government in South Sudan 
In and after the CPA, legislation relating to land and local government vaguely constituted the 
rights of communities. In 2009,  the Local Government Act of 2009 (Government 2009) was 
launched, defining the framework of local government in South Sudan. The specific contents 
of this act will be discussed further in the analysis. The Local Government Act connected the 
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rhetoric and recognition of traditional authority with the policies of decentralisation (Leonardi 
2013, 182). 
According to the system stipulated in the Local Government Act (Government 2009), the 
boma is the lowest administrative unit, the county is the top unit, the payam is between the 
two. The chiefs were given the sole executive and judicial rights at the boma level, the lowest 
administrative unit. New chiefdoms, bomas and payams, were created and these 
administrative units, the bomas in particular, became the point of service delivery with 
distribution of relief and aid as one of their tasks. Both the community and the leadership saw 
the local government as tasked with providing services such as provision of water, 
developmental aid, and setting up medical and educational facilities. As a result, the position 
of boma chief was upgraded because they were perceived as a resource to the community as 
they were the ones holding the key to the services (Leonardi 2013, 181–185).    
1.4 Yei River County 
Yei River County is a county in the western part of the state Central Equatoria. The town of 
Yei and the surrounding areas were “liberated”1 by SPLM/A as early as spring 1997. Situated 
close to the borders of both Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and on the road 
to Juba from the border, Yei quickly became a centre for relief and military operations. Soon 
after the liberation the SPLM/A moved parts of its exiled administration from Nairobi, Kenya 
to Yei, increasing the status of the area. Furthermore, Yei was the first county to have a 
civilian administration and became a showcase for the new local administration system in the 
wake of the National Convention. Yei was a relatively secure area after 1997 (Rolandsen 
2005, 160–163) and the SPLM/A built civilian institutions in an attempt to compensate for the 
skepticism they were facing in the area (Johnson 2003, 86–87; Rolandsen 2005, 160–163). In 
SPLM/A controlled areas, including Yei, there was a drive to establish liberation councils at 
the county, payam and boma level of local administration in 1998. Elections were held in Yei 
County and councils formed. Congresses were held on both the payam and county level, but 
                                                 
1 The term “liberated” is a common term for the capture of Yei by the SPLA, it was even common among 
expatriates working with international NGOs in the area in 1997(Leopold 2005, 22). 
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there is little data on how well they functioned on the boma level or if the councils at all 
convened (Rolandsen 2005, 161–163). 
Figure 1 Map of South Sudan with Counties (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2012a) 
The towns near the borders, including Yei, are said to have benefitted, both historically and in 
present time, from their proximity to the borders through cross-border trade, access to 
services and through exchange (Schomerus, de Vries, and Vaughan 2013, 7–10; Walraet 
2013). In a consultancy report on local structures, Rohn, Adwok Nyaba, and Benjamin (1997) 
suggests that Yei County has great economic potential, but that corruption linked to economic 
investments in the period between 1990 and 1994 delayed economic development in the area.   
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Figure 2 Central Equatoria State Map (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2012b) 
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Since the signing of the CPA in 2005 South Sudan has experienced waves of refugees 
returning to their original areas, both from the North and from other, primarily neighbouring, 
but also western, countries. Areas not heavily affected by armed conflict experienced 
internally displaced people settling in them towards the end of the Second Civil War. After 
the Government of Southern Sudan approved the right for all southern Sudanese to resettle, 
these people settled more permanently in the areas to which they were displaced (Walraet 
2013, 174–176). Since the Yei area has experienced relative stability, also throughout the 
recent conflict, this has made the area attractive for settlement.  
The first people who settled in Yei after the “liberation” were soldiers and their families. The 
following years saw the population of the town increasing significantly due to an influx of 
internally displaced people (IDPs), Congolese refugees and economic migrants. This settling 
was presented in a working paper by Martin and Sluga (2011) commissioned by 
Humanitarian Policy Group at the Overseas Development Institute based on extensive field-
research in Yei. Based on limited reliable demographic data from the area, they found that in 
2005 there was approximately 8500 IDPs in Yei. Reports from 2006 claimed that the number 
had decreased to a little under 6000. However, leaders in the Dinka community informed the 
researcher that there was more than 7000 Dinka in Yei (Martin and Sluga 2011). Although 
there is only limited amounts of reliable demographic data, it is clear that the migrant 
population of Yei is significant. Moreover, the current civil war has added to the number of 
people displaced from their home areas and it is expected that this has increased the number 
of IDPs in Yei. 
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2 Theoretical framework  
Peacebuilding and statebuilding and how they relate to each other is a relatively new field of 
research, entering the stage following the shift in how the international community view the 
consequences of renewed conflict (Call and Cousens 2008, 2–5; Paris and Sisk 2009a, 1–2). 
As a new state becoming independent following a long civil war, South Sudan is an object of 
both peacebuilding and statebuilding operations. This chapter aims at establishing a 
theoretical framework to analyse the status of local government in Yei River County, in terms 
of statebuilding and peacebuilding in a local perspective. First, the terms peacebuilding and 
statebuilding will be defined, followed by a discussion of the relationship between the two. 
The foundation for peacebuilding and statebuilding and what characterises a well-functioning 
state will then be discussed in order to establish the parameters for analysis of the status of 
statebuilding in Yei River County. Towards the end the importance of local ownership and a 
discussion of whether ownership below the national level should be an objective in 
international operations to promote statebuilding. Finally, the challenges faced by attempts of 
statebuilding and peacebuilding will be discussed.   
2.1 Peacebuilding and Statebuilding and Their 
Relationship  
Peacebuilding and statebuilding 
Peacebuilding is defined by Call and Cousens (2008, 4) as “actions undertaken by 
international and national actors to institutionalise peace, understood as the absence of armed 
conflict and a modicum of participatory politics”. In the late 1990s and early 2000 we 
witnessed an important shift in the emphasis laid on the relationship between weak states and 
to which extent peace is lasting (Call and Cousens 2008, 2–5; Paris and Sisk 2009a, 1–2). 
According to Caplan’s (2005) definition: 
“Statebuilding refers to efforts to reconstruct, or in some cases to establish for the first 
time, effective and autonomous structures of governance in a state or territory where 
no such capacity exists or where it has been seriously eroded” (Caplan 2005, 3).  
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As part of this shift, major actors and agencies began emphasising the construction and 
strengthening of legitimate government institutions in countries emerging from civil conflict. 
This is what is called post-conflict or post-war statebuilding (Paris and Sisk, 2009:1-2). The 
line marking when a country is in conflict, in war, post-war, post-conflict or peaceful is often 
unclear. When discussing peacebuilding it is easy to imagine a country being at war, and then 
after the signing of a peace-agreement, in peace. However, in real life the transition is not as 
clean cut. After the peace-agreement was signed in DR Congo, violent conflicts in certain 
areas were considered a part of a peaceful DR Congo and as such, the country was defined as 
post-conflict despite the presence of conflict in some areas (Autesserre 2009, 252–254). This 
thesis is a study of post-conflict statebuilding. After the signing of the peace-agreement in 
2005, South Sudan may have been considered as postwar, but some areas were still 
experiencing high levels conflict. As is discussed in the historical background, the SPLA 
captured Yei and the surrounding areas as early as 1997 and it remained relatively stable after 
that. Based on this I consider Yei River District to be in a state of post-conflict and, thus, in a 
process of post-conflict statebuilding and peacebuilding.  
Statebuilding is a specific part of peacebuilding, and is based on the view that in order to 
achieve security and development in a society emerging from civil war, functioning and 
accountable governmental institutions must be in place (Paris and Sisk 2009a, 1–2). The 
development of institutions and normative culture, including an effective administrative 
apparatus is important in this process (Lange and Rueschemeyer 2005, 20). As the analysis 
later on in this thesis shows, such institutions are not in place in South Sudan, providing the 
country with limited opportunity for achieving security and development. Statebuilding 
requires the coordination of a long list of actors and units, and the degree of success depends 
on the degree to which preexisting social institutions are integrated in the new state. These 
processes may often involve conflict and prolonged stalemates as the attempts by the state 
elites to subordinate individuals and groups may be faced with resistance (Lange and 
Rueschemeyer 2005, 20). Findings in this thesis indicate that reforms have been met with 
such resistance in Yei River District and these issues will be discussed further in the section 
on challenges, as well as in the analysis chapter.  
When looking at the characteristics of statebuilding in South Sudan, it is important to 
differentiate between statebuilding and nation building. The two concepts are related, but 
where statebuilding focuses primarily on public institutions, nation building deals more with 
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the national population’s collective identity (Paris and Sisk 2009a, 14–15). This distinction is 
worth keeping in mind as South Sudan is an infant country with a wide range of ethnic groups 
and tribes (Barnett and Zürcher 2009, 23–25). In this thesis, the focus will as such not be on 
efforts made to create or strengthen the population’s national collective identity, but rather on 
establishing institutions. In some cases, perceptions of identity may have an impact on the 
statebuilding process. This is clearly an issue in Yei as many refugees and internally displaced 
people have resettled in this area (Walraet 2013, 174–176), causing tension between different 
groups in the society and pressure on public institutions. In my work, I also found that people 
in Yei distanced themselves culturally from the rest of the country. I will deal with this more 
extensively in the analysis.   
Paris and Sisk (2009, 14) focus on the relationship between peacebuilding and statebuilding 
and define post-conflict statebuilding as “the strengthening or construction of legitimate 
institutions in countries that are emerging from conflict”. Peacebuilding, on the other hand, 
involves an effort to eliminate important causes of conflict and promote the security of the 
individual, societal groups and the state, and through that creating the conditions for a stable 
peace (Barnett and Zürcher 2009, 23–25). In Yei, and South Sudan in general, security for 
individuals and societal groups is a fundamental concern. My findings indicate that this has 
lead people not only to question the state’s ability to secure safety for its citizens, but also the 
state actors’ interest in doing so. In a peacebuilding process, the actors seek to remove the 
causes of violence and promote peaceful solutions through institutional change, including 
democratisation, in order to give voice to all segments of society and reduce the tendency 
towards arbitrary power (Barnett and Zürcher 2009, 23–25).  
Is Building the State Also Building Peace? The Relationship Between 
Statebuilding and Peacebuilding 
“Standing behind peacebuilding is statebuilding” (Barnett and Zürcher 2009, 26).  
This statement summarises a view that is shared by several scholars (Call and Cousens 2008, 
9; Barnett and Zürcher 2009, 23; Paris and Sisk 2009a, 1–3) that rebuilding or establishing 
functioning state institutions, at least to a minimum functioning level, is essential to 
successful peacebuilding. Stable peace in war-torn societies requires the creation of 
institutions with the capacity to handle disputes between groups through political process and 
non-violent means (Paris and Sisk 2009a, 1–3; Call and Cousens 2008, 9; Fukuyama 2014, 
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314). Although the terms statebuilding and peacebuilding are closely linked and sometimes 
used interchangeably, statebuilding may be seen as a tool to achieve peacebuilding (Barnett 
and Zürcher 2009, 23–26; Call and Cousens 2008, 4). 
Despite statebuilding being a tool for peacebuilding, the process of statebuilding does not 
necessarily contribute to peacebuilding. For the countries going through such a process, a 
failure of the institutions in achieving this may potentially contribute to renewed conflict (Call 
and Cousens 2008, 4; Barnett and Zürcher 2009, 23–25), and so is also the case for South 
Sudan. While the record of the international community’s success in stabilising conflict and 
post-conflict areas have been mixed, (Fukuyama 2014, 314–316) argues that the record is 
disappointing when it comes to statebuilding. As an example, Afghanistan is considered not 
to have a functional, legitimate central state, and while Iraq has experienced a collapse of its 
authority in the areas north of the capital in 2014. Neither Haiti nor Somalia has seen s 
functional government following the foreign involvement.  
As discussed above, I see statebuilding as an approach to peacebuilding, based on the 
recognition that security and development in post conflict countries partly depends on the 
existence of capable, autonomous and legitimate government institutions. Weak governance, 
on the other hand, is recognised as a contributing factor to a wide range of social ills, from 
poverty and famine to disease. Strengthening the institutions is not in itself sufficient to 
produce peace and prosperity, but it will reduce the risk of falling into the mutually 
reinforcing traps of violence and underdevelopment (Paris and Sisk 2009a, 3). As is 
mentioned in the background chapter, South Sudan is currently in a situation where violence 
and underdevelopment prevails. Hence, I argue that statebuilding is an important part of 
peacebuilding in South Sudan, as well as failed statebuilding playing a part in the 
underdevelopment of the country.   
2.2 The Foundation and the State That is Being Built 
As mentioned earlier, the British, in an uneven condominium with the Egyptians, ruled South 
Sudan as a colony until Sudan’s independence in 1956. Before the British, Yei River County, 
was also under Belgian and French rule (Johnson 2003, 9–21). Colonial rule has without 
doubt left a challenging legacy. The colonial state is viewed by some (Barnett and Zürcher 
2009, 27) to have had a profound impact on the so-called Third World state that South Sudan 
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is an example of. The colonial state was a creation of foreign forces and much of the internal 
apparatus, the political system and political economy, was designed to protect the interests of 
foreign actors and those local elites that were under their protection. In South Sudan this 
colonial state left behind an apparatus of traditional authority created by the British (Johnson 
2003, 12–13; Bakheit 1974, 27–28) that is still part of the system of local governance. The 
role of these traditional authorities in the system of local governance will be discussed at 
length in the analysis below (pp. 35-47).  
Post-war societies such as South Sudan are identified, obviously, by the presence of armed 
conflict in recent history. These societies may experience periodic flashes of violence and 
presence of a continuing climate of fear. Post-conflict statebuilding may be distinguished 
from other types of statebuilding by being faced with both threats to security and legitimacy. 
The combination of a history of violence and a presence of fear in the society has resulted in 
both individuals and groups having less trust in the state’s ability to guarantee security 
(Barnett and Zürcher 2009, 28). In a warn-torn society like South Sudan, the citizens may fear 
violent reprisals or fall victim of partial police forces or officials of the judiciary. In some 
areas the population is vulnerable because there is no police force present and crime prevails 
(Caplan 2005, 45). In a consultancy report, Harragin (2011) writes that the civilians in 
Jonglei, South Sudan, experienced better protection during the war than before and after. The 
lack of security forces in some of the areas within Yei River County, that some of the 
informants in this study pointed to, increases the vulnerability of the population and decreases 
their trust in the state.  
2.3 The State at the End of the Road 
According to Giddens (1993, 309) the modern state 
“exists when there is a political apparatus (governmental institutions, such as a court, 
parliament or congress, plus civil service officials) ruling over a given territory, whose 
authority is backed by a legal system and the capacity to use force to implement its 
policies”.   
Most definitions of core state functions include the provision of security, the rule of law, 
including effective police and justice system, and at least a basic ability to develop and 
implement budget plans and to collect revenues through taxes (Giddens 1993, 309; Paris and 
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Sisk 2009a, 14–15). The collection of taxes in a post-conflict society may be problematic as 
the state’s fight for the right to tax may be harder as other actors have become accustomed to 
the income from illicit tax collection during the conflict. During war, non-state actors may 
utilise the void left by the state to tax the population and in other ways benefit from economic 
activity, and when the year is over they are hesitant to give this up. Attempts to centralise the 
tax collection may be undermined, as was the case in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 
the late ninety nineties (Koning 2012, 234). During the long Second Civil War, South Sudan’s 
borderlands, particularly in the South, experienced growing economic activity, resulting in 
new elites taking their piece of the cake in the taxation (Walraet 2013).  
The best way to achieve long- term development is, according to (Evans 2005, 27–30), to 
combine responsiveness to market signals and bureaucratic control with bottom-up 
democratic control. Responsiveness to market signals means that the allocation of resources is 
efficient and based on an assessment of costs and benefits, making sure that the goals are 
consistent with the available means. This has not been the case for South Sudan, something 
that has contributed greatly to the difficult financial situation the country is currently in (de 
Waal 2014). Bureaucratic structures may create a potential for making the exercise of power 
more predictable, an important feature of the modern state (Evans 2005, 26–30), but this has 
not happened to any extent in South Sudan (de Waal 2014). Such structures also contribute 
greatly to orienting public institutions toward common societal goals rather than the interests 
of the individual (Evans 2005, 26–30). There are numerous examples of other factors than 
qualifications, such as kinship or economic ties deciding who will receive a given position. 
Chabal and Daloz (1999, 6) claim that there is no independent civil service in Africa,2 which 
contrasts with the bureaucratic structures discussed earlier. Both Johnson and de Waal claim 
that this is also the case for South Sudan (de Waal 2014; Johnson 2014).  
Part of these bureaucratic structures is that government employees receive salary-based 
compensation and are employed full-time. This makes state agents dependent on their 
positions to secure their livelihood, and as such limits their motivation for defiance (Lange 
and Rueschemeyer 2005, 8). However, Chabal and Daloz (1999, 5–8) argue that such a 
bureaucracy is not possible in uninstitutionalised states in Africa, where appointment and 
advancement is not based on meritocracy. According to de Waal's (2014) description of what 
                                                 
2 When the term “Africa” is used in this context it refers to Sub-Saharan Africa (Chabal and Daloz 1999). 
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he termed the kleptocratic state of South Sudan upon independence places South Sudan in this 
category.  
The collection of revenue on behalf of the state is an important function of the bureaucratic 
institutions. Moore (1998, 94–96) makes a distinction between what he terms earned and 
unearned income for the state. The degree to which the state’s income is earned is decided by 
how much organisational effort is put into the collection of income, as well as the level of 
reciprocity for the citizens. Together the income-collection performed by the bureaucratic 
organisation for the state and the system of reciprocity contributes to strengthening the 
relationship between state and society (Moore 1998, 94). When the state acquires its revenues 
largely from external sources rather than by earning income, it weakens the population’s 
position to both monitor and hold the state accountable. Strong dependence on unearned 
income, e.g. in the shape of foreign aid, weakens the incentive to establish an effective 
bureaucracy, which is an important trait of the modern state. As the citizens neither 
contribute, nor receives services in return, this also weakens accountability (Moore 1998, 
105–106). Consequently, the state-society relationship as a whole may suffer when service 
delivery occurs outside the state channels (Call and Cousens 2008, 10–11; Moore 1998, 96–
110). As discussed in the background chapter, South Sudan is a large beneficiary of aid 
(Norad 2014) and in addition it is heavily dependent on revenues from the oil industry 
(Rolandsen et al. 2015, 93). My findings showing that tax-collection is challenging on the 
local level reinforces the position of South Sudan as being highly dependent on unearned 
income, making it expected that the state society relations suffer as a result. 
In a war-torn society, the economic dimension is only part of the picture. Provision of security 
is essential. Policing is crucial, but only part of the provision of security and order. It is also 
of very important that an independent judiciary and penal system is established (Caplan 2005, 
46) because a failing justice system may contribute to new or renewed conflict (Call and 
Cousens 2008, 9–10). For South Sudan providing security for the citizens was a particular 
issue during the civil war (Rolandsen 2005, 191–193) and after the recent crisis (Johnson 
2014). If the goal of democratisation is to ensure that the state’s actions reflect the shared 
interests of the population, Evans (2005, 27–28) claims that there is no way of escaping 
bottom-up democratic control by ordinary citizens. When there exists a credible arena where 
individuals and societal groups may express their preferences and resolve conflicts, the 
incentives to use violence is weakened (Call and Cousens 2008, 9–10). However, this bottom-
19 
 
up democratic control is considered a fragile way of controlling the state compared to the 
market and bureaucracy (Evans 2005, 27–28), and the challenges associated with such 
liberalisation will be discussed below in the section on challenges (p.21).    
2.4 The Importance of Local Ownership 
“Without understanding something about how state-society relations have evolved, 
how war may have changed things or who has power and how power works, any 
generic peacebuilding strategy is likely to be a poor fit. In particular, traditional 
sources of authority and governance must be well understood- both their assets and 
liabilities.” (Call and Cousens 2008, 14).  
Over the last years, there has been an added focus on decentralisation, i.e. the transfer of 
political authority to local governments with the expectation that this will generate good 
governance (Harriss, Stokke, and Törnquist 2013, 3). Following this, statebuilding is not 
limited to top-down approaches focusing on national elites (Paris and Sisk 2009a, 14–15) and 
the need for bottom-up democratic control may be seen in correspondence with the general 
literature on the necessity of local support for reforms (Sending 2009, 4). In multiple works, 
the failing to understand local factors and respect local ownership by foreign personnel 
involved in peacebuilding and a lack of local ownership in general, are identified as important 
factors in failed efforts of peacebuilding (Chandler 2006; Suhrke 2007; Richmond 2007; Paris 
and Sisk 2009b; Sending 2009). The failure to see beyond the formal structures, and 
neglecting the more context-specific informal ones that Käihkö (2012, 183) identifies should 
also be taken into account. In order to understand the informal structures that have an impact 
on the process of statebuilding in South Sudan, we need local knowledge about the country.  
As discussed in the beginning of this chapter, removing important causes of violence in a 
society is an essential part of peacebuilding. In order to do so, understanding the core 
conditions that cause and sustain violence is crucial, and this understanding is reliant on local 
knowledge (Autesserre 2014, 70). Though knowledge of the local is important, many of the 
people working with peacebuilding lack field experience and have limited knowledge of the 
local (Call and Cousens 2008, 15; Autesserre 2014, 68). This is challenging particularly in 
rural areas because insofar as people do have field experience, it is often limited to the capital 
(Kappler 2013, 127–128; Autesserre 2014, 20–37, 68–89). This is a central point in this 
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thesis, as the case is an area outside the centre, several hours away from the capital, including 
rather rural areas.  
Sending (2009) states that despite the importance of local ownership having been established 
knowledge for a long time it has not been implemented in practice. He identifies two key 
reasons for this situation; the triumph of the universal over the local knowledge, and the 
triumph of international over local authority in the struggle for legitimacy. This may be seen 
in connection to Autesserre's (2014) distinction between what she calls local knowledge or 
country expertise and thematic or technical knowledge, where thematic knowledge is higher 
on the knowledge hierarchy. Local knowledge is a strong familiarity with a country or an area 
within an country, while thematic knowledge is an in-depth understanding of particular 
aspects of intervention work and technical themes (Autesserre 2014, 68–70). Thematic, or 
universal, knowledge has the advantage of being key in organisational learning. The people 
holding thematic knowledge may bring to a project ideas, techniques and approaches that both 
research and experience have identified as useful (Autesserre 2014, 70–71).  
However, Scott (1998, 19–21) makes a case against universalism as a simplification of the 
way we see the state by comparing the state to a forest. He describes how the industrialised 
German forestry had a too narrow focus on short-time profit, which resulted in the death of 
the forests. The account of scientific production forestry illustrates the dangers of taking apart 
a very complex and poorly understood set of relations and processes aiming at isolating a 
single element of instrumental value. As South Sudan is a diverse country with many ethnic 
groups and the different regions do not share a completely common history, I would argue 
that local knowledge is essential. This is confirmed by a multi-donor evaluation report by 
Bennett et al. (2010) on conflict-prevention and peacebuilding activities in South Sudan in the 
period 2005-2010. They found that USAID was one of the most efficient donors due to a 
number of their key staff members having extensive experience and knowledge of the area 
(Autesserre 2014, 83). The industrial German forestry’s aspiration for short time profit also 
serve as a valuable image of the potential consequences of not having a long-term focus, a 
matter that will be discussed in the next section.  
The call for local ownership has been a common trait of the international development aid and 
peacebuilding projects since the mid-1980s, and may be seen in relation to the growth of the 
people-centred understanding of development (Narten 2009, 252–253; Sending 2009, 4). If 
reforms are to be meaningful and sustainable, the commitment and ownership of not only the 
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government, but also an acceptance by the wider society needs to be in place (Collier and 
Dollar 2004, 255; Sending 2009, 4). However, relying solely on insiders for local knowledge 
makes the project vulnerable as there is no one unified body of local knowledge. There is a 
difference between the elite and non-elite perspective, and it is difficult to decide who’s 
version of the truth we should trust when dealing with opposing actors in a conflict 
(Autesserre 2014, 68–73). The challenge of elite and non-elite perspectives should also be 
seen in relation to the difference in centre and periphery, where the perspectives of the centre 
may differ greatly from the perspectives of the periphery. In the South Sudan context, this 
means that it is necessary to go outside the capital Juba, and get the perspectives of the 
population in the periphery including the people who do not speak English, as is attempted in 
this thesis.  
2.5 Challenges to Peacebuilding and Statebuilding 
Barnett and Zürcher (2009, 23) argue that “states emerging from war do not have the 
necessary institutional framework or civic culture to absorb the potential pressures associated 
with political and market competition”. What they call “shock therapy, peacebuilding style”, 
the push for instant liberalisation, undermines the very institutions that are instrumental for a 
stable peace. A more long-term focus may be beneficial, especially in terms of avoiding 
former combatants pursuing their interests to the extent that it leads to renewed conflict 
(Barnett and Zürcher 2009, 23–24). Related to this point is the political power struggle within 
the SPLM that has thrown South Sudan into its third civil war (Rolandsen 2015; Rolandsen et 
al. 2015; Johnson 2014).  
The power struggle within SPLM may also be seen in relation to Barnett and Zürcher (2009, 
24) accusing foreign NGOs and the UN of adopting strategies that are reinforcing previously 
existing state-society relations, promoting weak states that are characterised by patrimonial 
politics and skewed development. They claim that peacebuilding only transfers the 
ceremonies and symbols of the liberal democratic state, without contributing to substantial 
change. This is partly because the actors seeking to build peace have to navigate in a complex 
landscape of actors, with conflicting interest (Barnett and Zürcher 2009, 24). In the case of the 
local governance system in South Sudan the continuation of the chieftaincies may also be 
seen as an example of this (see below, p. 36).   
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The objective of peacebuilding is stability and liberalisation, while the state elites’ key goal is 
to maintain their power. Similarly to the state elites, the sub-national elites are concerned with 
retaining their position of power, through autonomy from the state and maintaining their 
control in the countryside. The state elites on the other hand may be suspicious of 
peacebuilding reforms because they fear that such reforms might give other actors the 
opportunity to usurp their power (Barnett and Zürcher 2009, 24). One way of handling this 
fear is power-sharing agreements made as part of peace-agreement, but regimes and strong 
men may use such agreements to strengthen their own hold on power (Käihkö 2012, 181). As 
discussed in the section on South Sudan’s road to independence, the CPA had such a power 
sharing agreement between the SPLA/M and the National Congress Party of the North. This 
left little room for other parties to take part in the power-sharing (Holt and Daly 2011, 163–
164) making this a case of the big men holding on to their power.     
The elite covet the resources that are provided by the international peacebuilding actors, as 
they may be useful for maintaining their power. The state elites are also dependent on the 
support from the subnational elites and local power brokers, who often gain increased 
influence during civil war, to acknowledge their rule. While subnational elites also seek the 
resources provided by international actors to maintain their standing and autonomy, they fear 
peacebuilding programs that might undermine their power at the local level and strengthen 
state control over the periphery (Barnett and Zürcher 2009, 24). In the case of this thesis, this 
is relevant because the state elites are mainly based in the centre, the capital Juba, while this 
thesis deals with the periphery. Programs that are aiming at strengthening bottom-up 
democratic control moves power from the top to the bottom, and as such undermines the 
power of the local elites as well. When power is moved from the top to the bottom, the elites 
at the levels above lose power. The way reforms which shift power, such as institutional 
reform in the state apparatus, are met may tell us something about this relationship.  
Peacebuilding is performed in order to implement a liberal peace, to deliver services and 
assistance that will create new institutions that may distribute or re-distribute political and 
economic power in a transparent and accountable way. Post-conflict elections may serve as an 
example of the art of equilibrium between stability and liberalisation; in order to maintain 
stability it would be ideal to wait several years to hold the first post-conflict elections, but it 
might be necessary to carry out elections earlier to meet demands of participation (Sisk 2009, 
220). Still, faced with this choice, foreign NGOs and the UN  will, according to Barnett and 
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Zürcher (2009, 31), choose stability over liberalisation, as stability is an important 
prerequisite for implementing liberalising reforms. State elites and sub-national elites who 
want to preserve their political power and protect their political and economic interests are 
motivated to contribute to stability rather than liberalisation. As such, foreign NGOs and the 
UN together with local elites create the appearance of change through pursuing their 
collective interest in stability and symbolic peacebuilding, while at the same time leaving the 
existing state-society relations largely intact (Barnett and Zürcher 2009, 25–31). The 
postponing of the 2015 general elections in South Sudan due to the political crisis in the 
country may serve as an example of this.  
Much foreign aid sets unrealistic timelines for the achievement of particular developmental 
objectives, partly because the funds allocated for the project must accounted for by the end of 
the annual cycle (Hyden 2005, 257). This is a serious challenge for peacebuilding projects, 
that in addition to being expected to fulfil the rigorous task of establishing lasting peace with 
very limited resources, are under pressure to do so in a limited time (Call and Cousens 2008, 
11; Barnett and Zürcher 2009, 31–32). This anticipation of rapid development is in great 
contrast to the growingly recognised requirement of sustained political attention to achieve 
successful peacebuilding (Call and Cousens 2008, 11; Lange and Rueschemeyer 2005, 20). 
The findings presented in this thesis signal that little progress has been made over the ten 
years that have passed since the signing of the peace-agreement in 2005, indicating that a 
short-term time frame is fruitless in this case. This will be discussed further later on.  
The element of conflict may especially be expected to be present in a post-conflict scenario 
(Barnett and Zürcher 2009, 30–31). Through enhancing the power of the state, statebuilding 
may create a perception of, or even factual, exclusion among alienated groups in the society 
(Call and Cousens 2008, 10). In the case of South Sudan this point should be seen in relation 
to the notion of “Dinka dominance”, the perception among people belonging to other ethnic 
groups that the Dinka are dominant in power positions in South Sudan (Johnson 2003, 51–
53). The question of Dinka-dominance will be discussed further in the analysis below (p. 55).   
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3 Research Design and Methodology 
The objective of this thesis is to gain insight into the process of statebuilding in the 
peripheries of South Sudan. In this chapter, I will account for the methodological choices I 
have made; how the sources I have used have contributed to answering the research question; 
and, the consequences of the choices made for reliability and validity. I will also account for 
some of the challenges I faced in the execution of the research, with a special focus on the 
fieldwork. To answer my research question I have made use of secondary literature and 
consultancy reports, as well as a substantial amount of data collected during my fieldwork in 
Yei River County. Throughout my fieldwork, I conducted altogether 42 interviews with 
government officials, chiefs, informants with general insight, and members of the community, 
40 of which were in Yei River County and 2 in the capital Juba. I also attended a chief’s court 
session and carried out participant observation.    
3.1 Research Question 
As the world’s youngest state, the post-conflict statebuilding project in South Sudan has been 
a joint mission of an array of players. International NGOs, the UN and national players have 
been involved in constructing and strengthening institutions, and significant amounts of aid 
have been put into achieving this. Literature on statebuilding and peacebuilding emphasise the 
importance of local ownership and knowledge (Call and Cousens 2008; Autesserre 2014; 
Chandler 2006; Suhrke 2007; Richmond 2007; Paris and Sisk 2009b; Sending 2009), but this 
has not been practised. International researchers and foreign personnel involved in 
statebuilding and peacebuilding efforts are being criticised for not giving sufficient attention 
to the areas outside of the capital (Kappler 2013). I wish to develop further knowledge of 
post-conflict statebuilding in the periphery and hence, the research question of this thesis is:  
How has statebuilding been implemented in South Sudan’s peripheries?  
The parameters for analysis will be the system of local governance, changes in this and how 
the reforms have been implemented and received. As a part of this, the relationship between 
local authorities, traditional authorities and the communities will be important. Furthermore, 
the ability of the state to provide services, infrastructure and guarantees of security will be 
assessed, as well as obstacles to these tasks.  
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3.2 Research Design: Case Study 
In order to answer my research question I have performed a qualitative case study of Yei 
River County in South Sudan. According to Gerring (2007, 19), a case is «a spatially 
delimited phenomenon (a unit) observed at a single point in time or over some period of 
time”. Case studies have the potential to achieve high internal validity (George and Bennett 
2005, 19 – 21), meaning that the answers found are likely to be true (Lund et al. 2002, 85–
86).  Variables such as democracy, power, political culture and state strength are essential 
features of studying statebuilding, but also difficult to measure. Because of this, I chose to 
perform a case study because this research design made it possible to consider contextual 
factors. This research design also has an advantage in identifying and measuring the 
indicators that best represents the theoretical concept of statebuilding (George and Bennett 
2005, 19 – 21). In this case, the in-depth study enabled me to gain insight in to different 
actors’ perceptions of these matters, as well as analysing them in relation to external reports.  
My case study has a weakness in terms of external validity, the extent to which the case is 
representative to a broader population of post-conflict statebuilding, not covered by this study. 
Focusing primarily on the one case; Yei River County in South Sudan, the case study suffers 
from problems of representativeness (Gerring 2007, 43). However, as Flyvbjerg (2001, 72) 
argues, a case study brings the researcher closer to real life situations and gives greater insight 
into the vast array of nuances in the matter studied. As my research question concerns the 
statebuilding process in the periphery, the local nuances are of particular importance. I also 
found it fruitful to draw on my own experiences from real life situations during my fieldwork, 
such as my own experienced difficulty of reaching the more remote bomas. This provided me 
with greater insight into the challenges the most remote communities are facing in regards to 
both accessing services and participating in political processes. The possibility provided by a 
case study to go deeper into the matter has been very useful in answering the research 
question (George and Bennett 2005, 20). In particular, the relationship between the 
communities in the area and the migrant communities would never have been properly 
captured without the opportunity to immerse myself in the daily life of Yei River County.    
Since the case study to a large extent allowed me to check the facts, consult multiple sources 
and delve deeper into the specific case (Gerring 2007, 59–60), it gave me the opportunity to 
gain more exhaustive knowledge of the mechanisms in the area. The governance mechanisms 
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associated with the challenging position of the boma chiefs was only revealed to me when 
reflecting over my observations from the field. Thus I was able to identify the compound 
pressure felt by the boma chiefs, and through that identify the new variables of poverty in the 
community and how this affected the chief’s income (George and Bennett 2005, 20) (see the 
analysis chapter pp. 40-42 for a discussion of these variables).  
In order to mitigate the consequences of the threats to the external validity, I chose a crucial 
case for my study. A case is crucial when it is most or least likely to fulfil a theoretical 
prediction (Gerring 2007, 115–116). Yei River County is a crucial case in that the conditions 
for statebuilding in this area was particularly favourable compared to other areas of the 
country, with the exception of being a periphery. As Yei was captured by SPLM/A in 1997 
and was under their rule from then on, this area has not suffered as extensively under the 
challenges of merging the two systems of governance as the areas ruled by the northern 
government. With a favourable economic situation, a higher educational level, and relative 
stability (Martin and Sluga 2011), Yei River County has good prospects to have successful 
statebuilding. If there is an area in the peripheries of South Sudan where it could be expected 
to find successful statebuilding, Yei River County is a likely case.  
3.3 Fieldwork 
“In the research of conflict, peace and development, fieldwork has become an indispensable 
element of data gathering” (Kappler 2013, 125). 
I conducted a fieldwork in South Sudan over a period of six weeks in January and February 
2015. I was particularly interested in the perspective of local stakeholders as the researched 
(see model 1 for definition of local actors in Yei River County), and to get closer to the 
researched, making fieldwork the preferable choice (Flyvbjerg 2001; Kappler 2013).    
A great deal of research on peacebuilding is not based on fieldwork or only fieldwork in the 
capital of the country receiving aid, as the case of South Sudan and the capital Juba. This 
limits the access to valuable information because it makes the researcher vulnerable to bias 
selection in data gathering and contributes to the same voices being heard over and over 
again. If the researcher only talks to the international peacebuilding actors or the, often 
English-speaking, elite in the capital, the perspectives of the other groups, the majority of the 
population, is lost (Kappler 2013). We can see several examples of this being a risk in the 
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South Sudan context with its heavy international presence, and distance between the elites in 
the centre and the rest of the population. To avoid this, I spent the majority of the time in Yei 
River County, and the rest in the capitol Juba. Although I was based close to Yei Town, I 
travelled to all the payams in the county (Tore, Muwgo, Lasu and Otogo), and met with the 
majority of boma chiefs in the payam centres. I also travelled to some of the bomas including 
some of the more remote ones, Ombasi, Tukuri, Mapuko, Mungo and Logamera.  
In addition to my research interviews, I found participant observation and informal 
conversations to be very important sources of information and insights. As I was staying in a 
compound together with local employees in Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), and had access 
to a training centre with both employees and students, I had many informal conversations 
related to my research questions. Most days when I was not travelling out into the remote 
areas of the county I would eat lunch at the training centre and the conversation topics would 
be the current crisis and political issues. As all of the people connected to NPA were informed 
of the purpose of my visit, several of them also took initiative to discuss political issues with 
me in less formal settings. These conversations, both the ones I took active part in and the 
ones I was only observing provided me with an important overview of the different views on 
how the chiefs were appointed. At one instance, one of my informants explained to me how 
the hereditary chieftainships had mechanisms for electing the heir best suited for the position, 
providing me with a potential explanation as to why this practice was not more widely 
contested, as I had come to expect.  
When so much of the data is collected through observation and informal conversations, the 
reliability, i.e. the chance of another researcher getting the same results (LeCompte and Goetz 
1982, 35), may be threatened. To mitigate this I have made detailed field notes and followed 
up on the information from observations and informal conversations in formal interviews in 
order to both have it validated or invalidated, or explore the matter further. Spending a great 
deal of time with the local employees without any other foreigners allowed me to become 
more integrated in the community, and through that access more information. This provided 
me with greater insight into the everyday life in the area and the lives of dominant narratives 
(Autesserre 2014, 6).   
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3.4 Interviews  
Interviews may reveal information that would not be available through relying solely on 
observation (Bryman 2004, 340) or other available sources (Willis 2006, 146). As different 
actors’ perception of the state system on the local level was of particular interest to me, 
interviews were the best way to access this information. Using interviews also has the 
advantage of making it possible to reconstruct previous events. However, such reconstruction 
has certain limitations as its reliability is limited by the informants’ memory and people’s 
tendency to interpret events retrospectively. Despite this, I find such accounts of previous 
events useful as they reflect the respondents’ perspectives on these events (Bryman 2004, 
340).  
For this study, I chose the semi-structured interview, basing the interviews around a list of 
broad questions I had identified when I prepared the fieldwork (Bryman 2004, 319–322). I 
started all my interviews by asking the interviewees to tell me about themselves, both to learn 
how they came into their position and to see how they perceive their own role in the 
community. I continued to ask the informants to tell me about the community, and followed 
up with a question about the challenges the community was facing. After this, I asked the 
informants about the relationship between the traditional authorities and government 
authorities and between the different levels of authority (see model 1). Lastly, I asked how the 
current “crisis”, a common term for the civil war and economic crisis, had affected the 
community.  
As the amount of information provided by the informants varied greatly, asking follow-up 
questions contributed to revealing supplementary information, something that would be more 
challenging using a more structured approach. One example of this is my interviews with the 
chiefs who said they had been elected where follow-up questions revealed that they had the 
chieftainship in their family and ran unopposed in the election. In addition to the advantage of 
revealing additional information, the qualitative interview focuses on the perspective of the 
respondent, a trait particularly useful in this study as the perspective of the informants 
provided useful information. The less structured form of the interviews also gave me added 
insight into the priorities of the informants, such as when I asked them what the main 
challenges in the community were, while at the same time providing me with comparable 
data.  
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3.4.1 Selection of Informants  
In order to answer the research question in the best possible way, I used purposive sampling 
of informants, as is recommended for qualitative research. In other words, I aimed at 
establishing a good correspondence between the research question and the sampling, 
interviewing people who were relevant to the research question (Bryman 2004, 333–334). As 
my thesis focuses on the statebuilding process at the local level in the peripheries of South 
Sudan, a purposive sampling meant recruiting informants from local government 
administration, traditional authorities and members of the community, as well as individuals 
with relevant information.  
In a qualitative study, the practical access to respondents may have great influence on the 
final selection of respondents (Bryman 2004, 333–334). This was something I experienced as 
a foreigner doing research through fieldwork over a short period of time. In order to establish 
contact with relevant informants I used contacts as door-openers (Weiner 1964), particularly 
in the first phase but also throughout my stay. Before arriving in South Sudan, I established 
contact with local employees of NPA. Through these contacts, I was introduced to other 
people who again acted as door-openers (Weiner 1964) in Yei. Before I started the 
recruitment of informants, I had an idea of whom I wanted to interview, but no means of 
contacting them. I did not know the names of specific people, but I knew that I wanted as 
many chiefs as possible as well as local government employees and representatives of the 
communities because, as discussed in the theoretical framework, the relationship between 
these actors is important for successful statebuilding.  
The head chiefs in the payams served as gatekeepers to the communities and the boma chiefs, 
having the power to block my access, because their acceptance and introduction served as an 
approval of my presence. The County Commissioner’s office also served as a gatekeeper 
because I needed a research permit from them to meet with other government officials and 
travel to the payams (Willis 2006, 147). As the payam directors were informed of my 
presence and were asked to be helpful when I contacted them by the County Commissioner’s 
office, they also served as a door-opener (Weiner 1964). In several of the payams, the payam 
director and the head chief cooperated to facilitate the meetings with the boma chiefs and 
other relevant informants.  
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In the end, I had interviewed either the payam director or the deputy director in all the 
payams, all the head chiefs and the majority of the boma chiefs. I had some interviews with 
elders and other forms of traditional authority, as well as members of the community, mainly 
youth and women. As virtually all the chiefs and government officials were middle-aged or 
old men, I wanted the perspectives of women and youth in the community to balance out the 
skewedness. Unfortunately, I was unable to get many interviews with members of the 
community, but I attempted to supplement with informal conversations when possible.  
The choice of using high level authorities as door-openers may have affected the findings of 
the study as I might have been conceived as being in alliance with either the government 
authorities or the head chief (LeCompte and Goetz 1982, 46). However, I saw this as the only 
way to reach the informants, as they were unwilling to talk to me without the approval of the 
head chief. I believe this had an impact on the interviews where the higher authority was 
present, for example, when the head chief followed me to my interview and it took place 
outdoors. The challenge of interviews in public places is discussed further down, but I 
attempted to avoid representatives of the authorities being present during interviews.  
In order to mitigate the threat of the informants fearing reprisals I was very careful in having 
my interpreter explain that I was independent from the authorities, and that the informants had 
the option of being anonymous. One group of women in Mugwo payam did not wish to 
provide me with their names. None of my other informants asked to be anonymous, but some 
of them asked to have parts of the interview anonymised. I met the wish of anonymising the 
parts they wished, and where it was impossible to avoid identification without changing the 
content too much, I did not use the data. Other than these specific sections, I did not perceive 
a threat to the interviewees, and as such did not find it necessary to anonymise them. It would 
have had a great negative effect on the internal validity of the thesis if I had anonymised the 
informants on a general basis, as the geographical markers that influence the responses are 
very important. If I was to anonymise them, I would have had to anonymise the case as well, 
weakening my findings greatly.   
3.4.2 Collecting the Information 
The setting of the interviews may influence the material gathered (Willis 2006, 148), but I had 
limited opportunity to control where the interviews took place and who was present. Some 
interviews took place in offices where it was possible to close the door, while other times I 
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had less control. These varied from cafés in Yei Town to under a mango tree in a remote 
boma. Sometimes this meant that a head chief was present while I talked to the boma chief, or 
that other people were close by, something leading me to treating some of the interviews as 
public statements rather than confidential conversations (White 2000). There is no sure way 
of knowing how this affected the information given. It is possible that what informants said to 
a greater degree reflected the accepted discourse, while leaving out statements that are more 
controversial. However, insight into the accepted discourse is also useful information (White 
2000). To the extent possible, I still attempted to keep the conversations private through 
choosing a secluded area or closing the office door, so long as the informant was comfortable 
with it. 
Another challenge in the interview setting was that many of my informants did not speak 
English to the extent that they felt comfortable giving the interview in English. Bujra (2006, 
174) writes that English speakers often tend to be part of a particular social sphere of wealthy, 
educated or powerful men. In Yei River County, I found this to be true, with the addition that 
more youths than elders mastered English. As I do not speak Kakwa, the dominant local 
language of the Yei region, and my Arabic skills are limited, I found that in order to access 
the perspectives of the people at the local level, I needed an interpreter. Without an 
interpreter, I would not have been able to interview most of the chiefs, elders or members of 
the community that I interviewed. However, research through an interpreter as a third party 
may be problematic (Bujra 2006; Borchgrevink 2003), as the following discussion will show.  
“The problem with dependence on local translators is that one may be restricted and trapped 
within their perspective on their own society” (Bujra 2006, 174). My interpreter served as a 
research assistant facilitating the interviews, as well as an informant in terms of explaining 
settings and who people were. This was very useful in both accessing informants, as well as in 
understanding the positions the informants held in the community (Borchgrevink 2003, 108–
110). However, I did experience the issue of the interpreter being restricted by his own 
perspective of the society, and eagerness to explain this to me. An anecdote from an interview 
with a chief may serve as an illustration of this. The chief was explaining how poor the people 
in his area were and how difficult this was, at the same time as he was expressing frustration 
that he did not get any pay for his work. I had heard this from several chiefs and wanted to 
investigate whether he felt trapped and found it difficult to collect large sums of money from 
poor people in his community, even if this was part of the foundation for his pay. Therefore, I 
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asked my interpreter to ask him about this relationship, whereupon the interpreter continued 
to explain to me that there is a system of fines and that they are independent of the person’s 
wealth. In the end, we agreed that he should ask the question and I got the answer, the chief 
did in fact reduce fines for poor people. After this, I had a conversation with my interpreter 
where we agreed that I would signal to him when I needed his explanations, otherwise he 
would only communicate my questions and the informants answers. In the interviews that 
followed, this was less of an issue.  
Even if recording interviews has the advantage of heightening the reliability of the work 
(LeCompte and Goetz 1982, 43), I opted to not record my interviews, but rather make notes 
during the interviews and write out these notes every evening. This was because I did not 
want to risk inhibiting the informants’ desire to speak freely with the presence of a recorder, 
and thus weakening the validity. Taking notes during the interview was challenging, but since 
I used an interpreter in many of my interviews, and as such were able to continue my notes 
while the interpreter asked the next question, this was not a major problem. I made time for 
writing out my notes, including observations during the interviews, every evening while they 
were still fresh in my mind (Willis 2006, 149–150). The few times I was unsure if I had 
written something down accurately, I contacted my interpreter who also made notes during 
the interviews to check if we had the same information. As a result, I believe that my notes 
are accurate. The choice of writing out the notes every day also gave me the opportunity to 
analyse the data continuously throughout the data collection, making it possible to adjust the 
course of the work when needed.  
3.5 Limitations and Challenges  
Throughout the fieldwork, I experienced many practical challenges, some of which I will 
discuss here. Even if Yei is one of the more peaceful areas of South Sudan, the issue of 
security is not one to be taken lightly and the security situation placed some limitations on my 
activities and movement. Having a good contact in the country where I did my fieldwork 
proved to be very useful (Binns 2006, 15) and NPA provided me with a place to stay and, 
most of the time, with transportation. I could only walk freely around the town centre of Yei 
during daytime. As a result, I had limited access to private conversations with people around 
town, something that might have deprived me of some perspectives. However, I was able to 
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meet different groups of people through other channels, and as such do not see this as a major 
problem.   
Binns (2006, 15) emphasise the importance of timing for a successful fieldwork, and 
recommends basing the decision on local knowledge. I performed my fieldwork during the 
dry season, making the roads of the area easier to travel and making it possible to reach the 
remote bomas by vehicle. Still, the poor road quality made transport time consuming, and due 
to the security situation, there were restrictions on travel after dark. I also realised in the initial 
phase that it was challenging to make appointments in advance. To mitigate this, I hired a 
research assistant who made appointments on my behalf and who was also my interpreter. 
This was an important help, especially when making appointments to go to the payams far 
from the centre, as many of the people I needed to contact did not speak English. Several of 
these areas did not have phone service, and I needed local knowledge to find someone who 
could get a message to the village or call the one person who had a phone. This made me 
spend a lot of time organising before I could start the actual collection of data and forced me 
to settle for deputies if the payam director was not present. As a result, I was left with limited 
time in the remote areas, making me dependent on the informants being available on short 
notice. This limited my access to community members in the most remote areas, but I was 
able to talk to some in every payam. Fortunately, I was able to meet the chiefs in almost all 
the bomas I visited despite not having an appointment, so the challenge of travelling did not 
affect my research greatly.  
One important challenge to this form of study is the influence the process of gathering of data 
will have on what is being studied, the informants might adjust their accounts regarding to 
what they expect that the researcher wishes to hear (Jenkins 1994, 438). For me this was a 
challenge, as this risk increases if the researcher is closely associated with someone that may 
be perceived to affect the lives of the informants. I was staying in the compound of NPA, as 
well as them providing me with transportation. This resulted in me being very closely 
associated to NPA. To limit the impact of this on my interviews I very clearly stated that I 
was an independent researcher, and asked my research assistant to also be clear on this 
(Kappler 2013). On some occasions in the early stages of my fieldwork, I experienced 
expectations that I could provide services because of my link with an NGO, and they focused 
on the need for services in the interviews. However, after I instructed my interpreter to be 
particularly clear on the matter, this did not happen anymore. I also experienced that after 
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staying in town for a while, rumour had spread that I was there for research, not to provide 
aid. Hence, I do not think this affected my data in any significant way.  
3.6 Conclusion 
Fieldwork to collect data through semi-structured interviews was the best approach for this 
thesis. However, researching in a developing country is not without challenges, some of 
which might have had an impact on my findings. I have taken measures to mitigate these 
challenges, and believe that the validity of the findings are acceptable. I believe that the range 
of informants I was able to reach, particularly informants holding positions in the local 
government system, is sufficient to give me an insight into the process of statebuilding in Yei 
River County. The in-depth knowledge gained by this case study may not have grounds for 
generalisation, but has value in terms of understanding the local context in a complex society.  
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4 Findings and analysis 
What implications have the changes in local governance had since 2005? How will they affect 
peacebuilding, statebuilding, social and economic development, and democratisation in the 
area? Do the experiences from Yei River County offer nuances or correctives to existing 
theories on post-conflict societies, discussed in the theory chapter above? In this chapter, I 
will present my findings from Yei River County in 2015, and compare them with the state of 
statebuilding and peacebuilding in South Sudan in 2005, when the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) was signed, and four years later in 2009. In the comparison I will focus on 
the threats to peace and stability identified in 2005 and 2009 by Bennett et al. (2010) in their 
report “Aiding the peace: A Multi-donor Evaluation of Support to Conflict Prevention and 
Peacebuilding Activities in Southern Sudan 2005-2010”. Drawing upon additional reports and 
secondary literature to supplement my findings, I will use the comparison as a basis for an 
evaluation of progress. 
In the first section I will focus on the structures of local government in South Sudan, 
expanding this to the status of infrastructure and service provision, and how this affects the 
confidence the people have in the state in the second. The third section will explain the issue 
of security, both in terms of protecting the population from violence and the justice system 
itself. The next section will outline the challenges that the migrant population, both new and 
old, pose for the community and how this is affecting the system of governance. Towards the 
end of the chapter, I will discuss how people from Yei rhetorically differentiates between 
internal migrants from other parts of the country, and themselves as Equatorians. I will use 
the term “community” to refer to the people living in an area, whether this is a village, the 
town or a larger area. This is a common term used by the people in the area, and I have 
interpreted it as meaning a group of people sharing a kind of fellowship beyond geographical 
placement.  
4.1 The System of Local Governance in Yei River 
County  
When studying statebuilding in Yei River County it is important to understand the formally 
instated system of local governance. Local governance in South Sudan is regulated by the 
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Local Government Act of 2009 (Government 2009) which states that local government in 
South Sudan shall comprise of three tiers:  
(1) The County, City, Municipal and Town (Councils); 
(2) The Payam and Block Councils (Coordinative administrative Units); and 
(3) The Boma and Quarter Councils (Basic Administrative Units). 
 
Model 1 Local government Yei River County 
In Yei River Countythere are four payams: Lasu, Tore, Mugwo and Otogo. The municipality 
is a construct outside the County (Government 2009), but with Yei Town as a municipality 
and being the centre of Yei River County it has been included in this study. A great number of 
the respondents based in Yei town expressed frustration and confusion as to the relationship 
between the county and the municipality, and pointed to the recent introduction of the 
municipality. One of the informants complained that the municipality “was not brought in a 
proper way” and that the ones affected by the changes were not consulted (Bakata Charles 
2015). This may serve as an example of the argument of Collier and Dollar (2004) and 
Sending (2009) that sustainable reform is dependent on accept by both the government and 
the wider society.  
The director of Yei Town Block considered the objections to establishing the municipality as 
a matter of simply lacking understanding and believed that it would soon settle. He explained 
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the conflict by saying “Those [the chiefs] in the quarter councils don’t understand the 
meaning of the municipality. It has only existed one year and the chiefs are used to “dealing 
with the county” (John Ponsiano Loro 2015). Other informants pointed to issues related to the 
relationship between the Municipality and the County, regarding tax collection in particular, 
and suggested that this was not something that would simply improve anytime soon (Richard 
Lugala God 2015; Fraser Joseph Lokule 2015). The restructuring of the administration within 
the county have apparently had an impact on how the tax revenues and other revenues from 
Yei town are allocated. As part of the restructuring, a separate chamber of commerce for the 
municipality was established, resulting in a conflict between the Municipality Chamber of 
Commerce and the County Chamber of Commerce. This conflict may be rooted in 
disgruntlement caused by the shifting of an important source of income from one set of 
powerful big men to another. The struggle related to who has the right to collect revenues in 
Yei town may be related to Koning's (2012, 234) discussion on why tax collection may be 
challenging in post-conflict societies. In his work he describes how several non-state actors 
have become accustomed to income from tax-collection, which may explain how changes in 
the organising of local government and the consequent shift in who benefit from taxation, 
may cause conflict. 
The confusion and conflict related to state and non-state governance is having a negative 
effect on state-society relations in the area, creating a sense that some stakeholders do not 
respect the chain of command instituted in the Local Government Act (see model 1). Some of 
the chiefs are reluctant to deal with the municipality and go straight to the county 
commissioner with their problems (Bakata Charles 2015). The shifts in power and resource 
allocation and the resulting conflict, has made the municipality appear to lack sufficient 
support and legitimacy in the community to act as a credible government authority.   
According to section 19 in the Local Government Act (Government 2009) “The 
administrative aspects of the Authority institutions and systems [i.e. traditional authorities] 
shall be incorporated in the three tiers of the Local Government.” In this lies a parallel 
structure for the traditional authorities, with representation at the different levels of local 
government. There is a paramount chief at the county level, a head chief at the payam and 
municipality level and a chief at the boma level. Many of my informants referred to the chief 
at the boma level as the executive chief or boma chief (see chart above).   
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Although there was a “head chief” in Yei town, there was apparently no paramount chief in 
Yei River County and people claimed that there in fact never had been an election for this 
post. Despite the fact that there was no paramount chief, I was repeatedly urged to meet with 
him. In the end, I followed the directions to the paramount chief’s office and made an 
appointment, only to realise that it was the office of the head chief of Yei. He was referred to 
as the head chief, despite the change in title to chairperson the establishment of the 
municipality had dictated. According to the clerk at the head chief’s office the head chief had 
taken on the role as acting paramount chief in the absence of an elected paramount chief. 
However, this information was not verified by other sources and was even contradicted by the 
office clerk at the County Commissioner’s office (Richard Lugala God 2015). The head chief 
in Otogo also referred to himself as the paramount chief, but when I asked he explained that 
the term had changed (Justin Towongo James 2015). This is one of many examples of 
confusion related to terms, titles and roles, a matter I will deal with more extensively later on.  
My informants gave inconsistent information about when an election for paramount chief was 
supposed to have taken place. Some claimed it should have taken place as early as 1997, just 
after the «liberation», or after the Local Government Act in 2009 and others yet after 
independence in 2011. Moreover, I got the impression that people were unsure of when the 
post of paramount chief was established. An office clerk at the County Commissioner’s office 
said that the position of paramount chief existed in the Old Sudan (i.e. before 2011 when 
South Sudan was a part of Sudan), but not in Yei. These irregularities exemplify some of the 
challenges of creating a uniform system of local governance in a country with different 
historical practices. It is possible that this confusion may result from the area now called Yei 
River County being part of the Belgian controlled Lado Enclave, and not under British control 
until later (Leonardi 2013, 41–51), and as a result was not subjected to the British 
institutionalisation of the tribal leadership. It is also worth noting that many of the informants 
mentioned the establishment of Yei River County as a smaller unit than the earlier, 
considerably larger Yei River District. This appeared to leave some people confused as to 
what functions belonged to which level.  
The controversy surrounding the establishment of the municipality and the confusion 
regarding the position of paramount chief may be seen as two clear signals of the state failing 
to reach the lower levels. In the case of the municipality, the failure to include the actors 
affected by decisions in the process appears to have had a great negative impact on the 
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support for the change. The complaints I heard were directed at the process of implementing 
the change rather than the change itself, something that would support the claim that the 
process had a negative impact. However, it is possible that the complaints were directed at the 
process because it was easier to criticise a flawed process than the reform itself. Had the 
process been better, they might have criticised the reform itself. Still, finding that actors who 
are part of the system of local governance ignore the changes in the system because they are 
not satisfied gives reason for concern. It shows that the state has failed in strengthening and 
developing legitimate institutions, and through that failed in creating the conditions for 
creating stable peace (Barnett and Zürcher 2009, 23–25). This may also be seen as a sign that 
the state is lacking in capacity to mobilise support or force compliance from the lower level 
actors.  
When discussing why there is so much confusion and unwillingness to comply with the 
system of local governance it is important to take into account the knowledge of the Local 
Government Act among the parties. It is reasonable to expect that the Local Government Act 
(Government 2009) exists in an Arabic version, Arabic being an official language, but I never 
saw a version in any other language than English. One of my informants pointed at this as 
challenging for implementing local governance in South Sudan (Lubari Ramba Lokolo 2015). 
My general impression is that there generally is not sufficient knowledge of English to 
understand the Local Government Act in the area, as most of my interviews with chiefs were 
carried out with the use of an interpreter due to their lack of proficiency in English.  
Furthermore, I observed that while most of the people could speak Arabic, very few knew 
how to read it. Therefore, even if an Arabic version of the Local Government Act existed, it 
would be of little help as many of the people I talked to would not be able to read it. This is a 
very serious threat to the accountability of the state apparatus and the bottom-up control that 
is strongly emphasised by Evans (2005, 27–28). When neither the actors who are part of the 
system of local governance, nor the population may access the information of their 
responsibilities, it is very challenging to check the power of the elites. It is also challenging 
for the players holding positions, such as the chiefs, to know what their duties are, and as such 
difficult to perform them.  
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4.1.1 The Boma Level- Where the Chief is not the Boss 
Establishing that there shall exist traditional authority on all the local levels, the Local 
Government Act section 19 (Government 2009) moves on to state that the boma is the main 
domain of the traditional authority and consequently the place where traditional leaders 
perform their administrative and customary functions. However, my findings regarding the 
position of the boma chief show that he is heavily dependent on the payam, and even the 
county in handling issues. The acting chief of Mungo boma explained that when facing a 
problem “we sit down, we write reports to the payam director or the commissioner and any 
assistance will come through this channel.”(Samuel Aminga Mangora 2015). This approach 
to challenges in the community seemed to be common in all the bomas, with the main 
variation being the frequency of meetings with the director, which was again depending on 
how far away from the centre the boma was located. The function of the boma chiefs as 
channels of requests rather than individuals exercising influence upwards in the system may 
be seen as a feature that has survived since the British created the chieftaincies as a low cost 
way of controlling the people (see introduction chapter p. 2). This corresponds with 
Leonardi’s (2013, 190–195) description of the community and the chiefs themselves seeing 
the boma chiefs more as messengers for the government or interlocutors between the 
government and the rural population than a power institution.   
Below the boma level, there are headmen and sub-chiefs that are responsible for parts of the 
community, a geographical area or a number of families. This responsibility implies both low-
level conflict resolution, and reporting to the boma chief on matters of the community, such 
as deaths, disease or births. Apparently, the boma chiefs are in a squeeze between the higher 
levels of payam and county and these lower levels. The boma chief in Asole boma in Lasu 
payam said “If there are some [problems] it will be solved by the headmen, the sub-bomas, if 
it is too hard for them I will handle it. Most of the cases are being handled by the community” 
(John Thomas 2015). Most of the boma chiefs I interviewed explained that a great portion of 
the issues they were faced with would be handled through sending reports to either the payam 
director or the head chief. This practice leaves the boma chiefs with little room for action as 
most decisions are made over their heads. One informant explained how the creation of the 
payams had effectively transferred power away from the boma chiefs to the payam directors, 
while the traditional legal authority had been transferred to the head chiefs. He even went as 
far as to say that “the boma chiefs are now playing a minimal part. They don’t even have 
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informal power left” (Manoah Aligo 2015). This is in conflict with what Leonardi (2013, 
182–186) found about the boma chiefs’ position being elevated in the wake of the CPA. 
However, as she notes, part of the cause of the elevation was the expectations of services such 
as health care, education and water provisions that would be channelled through the boma. 
According to many of my informants, these services had yet to materialise, something that 
may have led to a devaluation of the boma chiefs.  
The transfer of power to the payam level from the boma level may indicate a centralisation of 
power. This may have a negative impact on the ability of all segments of the society to voice 
their opinion, and through that have a negative impact on the process of peacebuilding 
through statebuilding, as discussed in the theoretical framework (Barnett and Zürcher 2009, 
23–25). This is especially interesting in view of my findings indicating that there were distinct 
differences between the bomas within the payams as to the challenges they were facing. In 
particular, the more remote bomas expressed a sense of isolation, and it is possible that the 
transfer of power to the higher level will reinforce this.  
Contrary to the recommendation that state employees are full-time employed and receive 
salary-based compensation (Lange and Rueschemeyer 2005, 8), the boma chiefs receive no 
salary but are expected to generate their own income. Even if it is possible to argue that boma 
chiefs are not state employees as they are (supposed to be) elected by the community, my 
interviews show that they view themselves as government officials. This situation is made 
more difficult for the boma chiefs because cases that they are supposed to handle, which 
would generate income, are being handled elsewhere. The boma chief of Asole John Thomas 
(2015) explained, “there is no salaries for us because some of the cases we are supposed to 
solve are actually being solved by the community themselves”. In combination with the 
finding that the levels above the boma leave little scope of action for the boma chiefs, this 
leaves the boma chiefs in a difficult situation.   
The boma chiefs I interviewed said that they were unable to sustain themselves through fines 
and tax revenues. Nearly all of them raised the issue of not having a salary, giving the 
impression that this was a recent change. “Before, I was having salary, but of recent it was not 
there. The local government told us to take any amount from court cases in our boma to take 
as our salary” the boma chief of Tukuri said (Simon Logoro Abui Lupe 2015). However, the 
boma chiefs are faced with the difficulty of seeing the poverty in the community at the same 
time as they are supposed to collect their own income from the people. The boma chief of 
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Tukuri Simon Logoro Abui Lupe (2015) explained that when he saw someone in financial 
difficulties he would reduce their fines. This serves as an example of the challenge of being a 
part of the community while also being expected to make unpopular decisions. This coincides 
with Leonardi’s description of chiefs trying to distance themselves from situations that would 
put strain on their relationship with the local community of which they are also a part 
(Leonardi 2013, 192–194). For the boma chief of Tukuri I would imagine this to be even 
more challenging as he described himself as being alone with the responsibilities as Tukuri is 
located far from the centre. He continued to state “I don’t know why they made the change” 
(Simon Logoro Abui Lupe 2015), a statement that sums up some of the challenges faced by 
the boma chiefs. They seem to be lacking insight into why decisions are being made at the 
higher levels and, perhaps more importantly, lacking any influence on the decisions. Based on 
my interviews with boma chiefs it appears that this tendency is clearer the farther away from 
the centre, both the payam centre and Yei Town, the boma is situated.  
Some of the informants from remote bomas also listed the issue of transportation as 
contributing to this challenge residing in the periphery. The boma chief of Tukuri Simon 
Logoro Abui Lupe (2015) said that he could not always attend the meetings in the payam 
because transportation costs were too high. The issue of infrastructure will be dealt with more 
extensively in the following, but the centre-periphery aspect of this finding deserves some 
attention.  As discussed in the theoretical framework and also by Autesserre (2014, 68–73) , 
the difference between the centre and periphery may be seen in relation to the difference 
between the elite and non-elite perspective. When the representatives of the communities in 
the periphery are effectively excluded from the decision-making body, this may be an 
obstruction of the bottom-up democratic control that is important if the state is to serve the 
population (Evans 2005, 27–28). The lack of contact between the periphery and centre should 
also be seen in relation to the need for the state to have control over the periphery (Barnett 
and Zürcher 2009, 24), especially in a post-conflict-situation.  
4.1.2 The Alternative Authority of the Elders  
According to the Local Government Act (Government 2009), the representation of traditional 
authority is to be channelled through the chiefs at the respective levels, with the boma level as 
the main domain for traditional authority. This implies that the chiefs are the dominant 
authority and in the strongest position at the boma level. Most of the informants said that the 
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chief was to be elected by the community, either through a raising of hands or by people 
standing behind their preferred candidate. When inquiring further, I more often than not found 
that the chieftainship was in the family of the elected chief, and as such was hereditary. Some 
of the informants stated that they had inherited their position.  
When inquiring about the purpose of the election when the chieftainship was hereditary, I was 
informed that there sometimes were more than one candidate in the family, and that it was 
common to choose the one best suited and not necessarily the oldest. As such, the elections 
served a function in choosing the one best suited in the family. This perspective also offers an 
explanation as to why several of the informants were reluctant to see any correspondence 
between their fathers, grandfathers and great grandfathers being the chief and themselves 
winning the election. It is difficult to say exactly why most of the chiefs were reluctant to 
acknowledge that their position was inherited, but one possibility is that they did not see the 
position as hereditary as they had won an election. However, we may also consider the 
possibility of them adjusting their answers to accommodate what they assumed that I, as a 
Western researcher, wanted to hear.  
Some informants commented on the matter of seemingly hereditary chieftaincies and the 
consequences for democracy. One of them said that many people now are thinking that 
electing chiefs would be better since it could prevent unsuited or incompetent people 
inheriting the positions. He further believed that the chiefs see this as a threat, fearing that 
they will lose if people with higher education compete (Lubari Ramba Lokolo 2015). As 
discussed in the theoretical framework, the integration of these “traditional” authorities into 
the system created in the wake of the CPA, should be seen in relation to Barnett and Zürcher's 
(2009, 24–30) claim that peacebuilding operations sometimes contribute to re-enforcing 
patrimonial structures. As the majority of the elections appear to be sham elections rather than 
actual open elections for these posts, it may be seen as an example of a transfer of ceremonies 
and symbols of the liberal state.  
Many of the chiefs were reported to come from families who owned the chieftainship, and 
even referred to it as something like a kingdom. However, in accordance with the 
observations of Leonardi (2007; 2013) in this region, I found that the chieftainships were not 
necessarily as traditional as is often claimed. Most of the chiefs I interviewed could only trace 
the chieftainship in their family back to when the the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium colonial 
power appointed a grandfather or great grandfather of theirs as chief. A few of the chiefs had 
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been appointed by the SPLA, but still assumed that their sons would inherit the chieftainship. 
These “SPLA-chiefs” appeared to be less controversial than the ones tracing their authority 
back to the time of the British rule. This difference should  be seen in relation to Leonardi’s 
(2013, 180–182) findings showing that chieftainship was a “definer and signifier of 
community” in the prelude to South Sudan’s independence. She writes that tradition and 
custom had become a useful rhetoric that simultaneously broke down and re-enforced local 
identities in the aftermath of a war.  
In an attempt to understand not only why there were so few open and free elections, but also 
why the informants wanted to give the impression that there were elections, I asked one of my 
contacts about this in an informal conversation. He explained that the chosen heir in the 
family that holds the chieftainship is groomed throughout his childhood and adolescence to 
take over the position of chief. Moreover, it is not obvious that it is the oldest who is chosen, 
but any in the line they perceive to be best suited for the task. This perspective brings about 
the question of whether the ideal of elections, as stipulated in the Local Government Act 
(Government 2009), is in reality an ideal imported to placate the international community. My 
findings give different answers to this question; some of my informants have indicated that 
there is a wish for more democratic elections, while others have expressed satisfaction with 
the current practice. As such, the desire to democratise the traditional authorities through open 
elections does not appear to be a South Sudanese idea, but not entirely foreign either. This 
ambiguity should be seen in relation to the fact that a great deal of the population in the area 
spent several years abroad during the war, both in neighbouring countries and farther away. 
As a result, they may have brought different ideas of governance back with them. This 
ambiguity is not necessarily a question of whether the community seeks democratic control, 
but rather a question of how they want to organise themselves. 
While the boma chiefs appear to have less power than stipulated in the Local Government 
Act, I found that so-called elders still hold considerable power in the communities. Their role 
is not clarified in the Local Government Act, and as such is not regulated by law. In a meeting 
concerning the current political situation in South Sudan at Juba University Dr. Alfred Sebit 
Lokuji (2015) explained that the authority of the elders was weakened in some areas due to a 
military culture emerging and destroying the local structures. This view is further supported 
by Bennett et al. (2010) in their report of threats to stability in South Sudan. This is in contrast 
to my findings discussed above, where I found that this was in fact not happening in Yei. 
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There, the elders appeared to have kept their position to some extent, even if they are not a 
part of the system of local governance. However, it is worth noting that their report covered 
the entire South Sudan, while my thesis focuses mainly on the Yei River County. The reason 
for this discrepancy may be found in the fact that the area I studied has not seen heavy 
fighting for many years and less widespread weapon use in general. Several of the people I 
talked to told me that there were fewer weapons in this area than in other parts of the country.  
Many of the informants I talked to emphasised the role played by elders and so-called 
monyemenus3 in conflict resolution and in the community in general. A monyemenu was 
translated to me as a landlord, a custodian of the land on behalf of the community. The 
position of monyemenu is inherited from father to son, and is linked to the control over a 
specific piece of land. The Monyomiji age systems are identified in the Equatoria region of 
South Sudan, as a system of generational governance where power in the community is 
transferred from one generation to the next as a circulation of elites. This system is often 
found in combination with various other forms of traditional authority, such as rain makers. 
Monyomiji may also be used as a term for an age-group of elders (Simonse 1998, 51–65). I 
interpreted the position of the monyemenus described in my interviews as similar to the one of 
elders, as advisors. Further, I found no evidence that there is a transfer of power in this region 
as is practiced further east. As a result, I have treated the information regarding monymenus in 
Yei as part of the system of elders as advisors.   
In the villages, one of my informants described the role of the elders  sometimes serving as 
the first point of contact for the community when they are facing a problem and the problem 
is then transferred to the headmen if they are not able to handle it (Justin Muhamed 
Murusaleh 2015). Disputes over land are some of the most common issues in the 
communities, and are often related to borders between properties or the use of land. One of 
the head chiefs explained that “we need elders to explain who’s land this is” (Joseph Brown 
Lo-Mose 2015). The elders have an important function in settling these matters, not only on 
the grass root level but also as advisors for the chiefs. One of the boma chiefs explained the 
relationship between the chiefs and the elders like this: “Sometimes we have conflicts, land 
                                                 
3 Monyemenu is the spelling I was provided with by my interpreter, but the term is used throughout the region 
with different spelling.  
46 
 
disputes within the community. If [we have these] in an area, the chiefs may go and call the 
parties and the elders will say what is right” (Abui Hilary Gabriel 2015).  
The elders are highly esteemed  and one head chief went as far as to say “traditionally, if we 
don’t respect the elders and have a linear relationship, we cannot get blessing from the Gods” 
(Justin Towongo James 2015). The significance placed on the elders may be further illustrated 
by an event that took place during my stay in Yei. A chairman of the elders in Yei 
Municipality was found dead in the river after having been missing for some time. This lead 
to most officials in the town being unavailable and numerous meetings being cancelled, and I 
was informed that they had all gone to “the funeral place”. Later, the head chief Peter Sayed 
Murusaleh (2015) explained that “all the big men are going to the funeral, government 
officials, chiefs and elders”. The way all the officials and other big men dropped everything 
when they got word that the elder was dead may indicate that the linkages between the people 
in power positions are tight.  This seems to correspond with Leonardi’s (2013, 147–164) 
findings that the elders, spiritual leaders and chiefs together formed a local political elite. As 
these authorities were chosen to represent the community in the handling of disputes with 
neighbouring communities or the local authorities, they formed a political community. My 
finding that, despite the recent conflicts in the municipality, the “big men” were all gathering 
around the funeral of the elder that passed away may imply that such a community still exists.    
The role played by the elders serves as an example of the close link between the  new formal 
system and the old informal system. Before the appointment of chiefs, the system was 
founded on elders. Even as the elders have limited formal power in the system of local 
governance, they hold an important position as advisors and leaders in the community, giving 
them informal power. It may seem as if the advisory position of these elders is a way of 
circumventing the system of local governance placing the traditionally powerful elders back 
in a position of power. This may be seen as a reinstatement of the old system, as described by 
Leonardi (2013, 29). Before the system of chiefs was created, elders who acted as rainmakers 
or other leaders in the community was the one to whom foreigners were directed to when 
requesting to meet “the chief”.  
In the same way as the opposition to the establishment of the municipality and the confusion 
regarding the paramount chief, the strong position of the elders may also be seen as a sign of 
the state’s inability to reach the lower levels. One of my informants explained that before the 
system of chieftaincies was brought, clan elders was the local authority (Manoah Aligo 2015). 
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This claim is supported by Leonardi’s (2013, 9–11) description of people claiming seniority 
in local political structures undermining the power of the chiefs. As such, the system of elders 
and other forms of traditional authority predates the chiefs and should be seen in relation to 
old elites holding on to power despite reform. This may be seen as relating to the claim by 
Barnett and Zürcher (2009, 24) that foreign NGOs and the UN only transfer the ceremonies 
and symbols of the democratic state when they are attempting to build peace, without 
contributing to any substantial change. The formal model of local governance has changed, 
but the practices on the ground appear to have remained largely the same.   
4.2 When the State is not the Service Provider 
According to Barnett and Zürcher (2009), a major function of peacebuilding is to enable the 
state to provide its population with services and security. The infrastructure and provision of 
services in South Sudan is underdeveloped after years of civil war. In most of the interviews, 
as well as in a great deal of informal conversations, the weak infrastructure and scarcity of 
services provided by the state were repeated subjects. The standard of roads became the 
subject of much small talk when we travelled long or even short distances by car, an 
experience similar to riding a rollercoaster.  
The need for better infrastructure and services was the first issue raised whenever I inquired 
about the challenges faced by the communities. Many of the informants living in the remote 
areas of the County complained that they would need to travel a long distance to get to a 
hospital, and that the schools were inadequate. One boma chief told me that if it was raining 
the children would have to be sent home from school because their classroom was the shade 
of a mango tree (Abui Hilary Gabriel 2015). Others again told stories of women not reaching 
the hospital in time when in labour because there were no vehicles in the area.  
The issue of people’s lives being affected by the lack of infrastructure is not just a tale of 
human suffering; it is also a tell-tale sign of a state not functioning. Many of the informants, 
especially in the rural areas, had little faith in the state being able to do much to help them 
with their problems. The head chief of Otogo Justin Towongo James (2015) explained that he, 
together with the payam director, would take their problems to the county commissioner, not 
because he could do anything, but because he could draw the attention of an NGO to the 
matter. As discussed in the theoretical framework, this may serve as a de-legitimation of the 
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state apparatus. When the state is not the service provider the population has few incentives to 
pay taxes, and the state is less accountable to the citizens. This also contributes to tax 
collection becoming even more challenging for boma chiefs in the more remote areas, as their 
population see even less of the services that the state is supposed to provide. One of my 
informants,Simon Logoro Abui Lupe (2015), suggested that people were reluctant to pay 
taxes since they were not used to staying in one place long enough to pay taxes during the 
civil wars, and that it was lack of information and pressure from the top that was the reason 
for the still not paying. This explanation is supported by Tvedt's (1994, 72–88) account of the 
failure of the state to establish economic ties with the community it was supposed to serve 
after the Addis Ababa agreement of 1972 and the years that followed.  
4.3 Security and Justice, or Insecurity and 
Injustice? 
In chapter 2, the provision of security for the population is identified as a primary objective of 
peace- and statebuilding operations. As such, the state’s ability to provide security for its 
population is a good indicator as to the state of the state. In the provision of security lies a 
functioning justice system and the ability of the state to protect its citizens against violence. 
This section is divided into one subsection on general security concerns and one on the justice 
system, so that physical threats to the security of the population is dealt with separately from 
the issues of the population’s trust in the justice system.  
4.3.1 Security issues 
“We are afraid that they [the LRA] will be a problem, because maybe no one will come 
and rescue us.”  
The quote above is from a youth, David Lomoro (2015), interviewed in Tukuri boma a remote 
boma in Lasu payam near the border of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Tukuri boma is 
one of the most remote bomas in the county, closer to the Congolese border than their own 
payam centre. In the past they have suffered attacks from the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), 
a rebel movement originating from Uganda and known for their violent operations in the 
region (Schomerus 2007). They also feel vulnerable to the militias based in the large forests 
on the opposite side of the border. The boma chief of Mundo boma, a remote boma in Tore 
payam, said that they had experienced many of the same challenges, but that the building of 
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army barracks in their area had helped (Paul Ondongo Manya 2015). In Tukuri, on the other 
hand the reports to the county have not resulted in any additional security forces, leading to 
the people expressing a sense of being neglected because they are far from the centre (David 
Lomoro 2015). As such, the case of the security situation in Tukuri serves as a clear example 
of the state failing to provide security for its citizens.  
Bennett et al. (2010) pointed to the threat of LRA in both of their evaluations of 2005 and 
2009, and even as the attacks have ceased over the last years, the memory of the threat still 
has an effect on the people in the region. This was particularly prominent in the most remote 
bomas, which may be seen in relation to the conflicted relationship between the centre and the 
periphery. These findings indicate that the South Sudanese state despite less acts of violence 
is still failing in the important task of providing security for its citizens. Even though the 
security situation in Yei River County is better than in other areas of the country, these 
observations of the state failing to provide security for its citizens are causes for worry.  
4.3.2 Distrust in the Justice System 
The importance of custom and tradition as a source of law was emphasised in the 
development of a South Sudanese justice system after the signing of the CPA in 2005. In 
2010, Leonardi et al. (2010, 10–12) found that chiefs and their courts was the only source of 
justice across South Sudan. This, however, brought with it its own challenges as these chief’s 
courts do not hold a formal position in the justice system. The government authorities have 
struggled to find the position for this element of the judiciary, which has created added 
confusion. With the state’s limited capacity, questions have been raised regarding its ability to 
provide the population with justice. In several of the interviews, the informants communicated 
a lack of trust in the justice system. The distrust covered everything from chiefs choosing to 
make arrests themselves to allegations of criminals being released because they have powerful 
relatives or were connected to the ruling elite. The head chief of Yei even said that “If the 
person [who commits the crime] is a soldier you have no justice” (Peter Sayed Murusaleh 
2015), expressing little faith in an independent justice system. This corresponds with similar 
findings by Bennett et al. (2010, 98), showing that little progress has been made since the 
signing of the CPA.   
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One informant claimed that the arrests of several chiefs in the area4 were a result of their 
objecting to the creation of the municipality and that the municipality was conveniently 
declared during their incarceration (Manoah Aligo 2015). I was not able to find any 
undisputed evidence for his claim that these chiefs were arrested simply because they had 
objected to this reform, but it was confirmed by several informal conversations later on. Since 
this apparently was a relatively widely shared perception, I see this in relation to Caplan's 
(2005, 46) emphasis of an independent judiciary system and Call and Cousens' (2008, 9–10) 
argument that failure in the justice system may contribute to renewed conflict. A prevalent 
perspective of the justice system was that it did not operate independently, but rather as a tool 
for muzzling opposition, is a threat to the government authorities’ legitimacy.  
In 2009, Bennett et al. (2010, 97–100) found that the investigation of efforts to establish rule 
of law and an efficient judiciary had been largely focused on the centre Juba. The levels 
below the national level had received little attention, and as such, the justice system was 
underdeveloped on the eve of independence. Throughout my fieldwork, I heard many stories 
of a failing justice system, leaving me with an impression that not much progress has been 
made in this field. When someone experienced a crime or in some other way heard news of a 
crime, the idea that the perpetrator would receive punishment administrated by the justice 
system was ridiculed. This indicates very low levels of trust in the justice system,  
Bennett et al. (2010, 98) estimated that more than eighty percent of the population in 2009 
had access to justice only through customary law, despite the focus on strengthening formal 
institutions. As discussed in the theoretical framework, the establishment of an independent 
judiciary is an important part of statebuilding. Both the findings of Bennett et al. (2010) and 
my own indicate that such an independent judiciary has not been established, or at the very 
least that the population do not view the justice system as independent. This realisation places 
this case well within the framework of Caplan (2005, 45) and Barnett and Zürcher (2009, 29) 
on judiciary in war-torn societies as discussed in the theoretical framework, and as such 
serves as an indicator of the non-functioning state.  
Despite their low levels of trust in the justice system, most of my informants still upheld the 
view that they as Equatorians would not resort to violence. This rhetoric may be seen to 
                                                 
4 See http://www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView/mid/519/articleId/10764/Six-Chiefs-
Arrested-In-Yei-County.aspx  
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contrast the point made by Caplan (2005, 45) that crime prevails when the justice system 
fails, since the criminal acts in this case apparently do not seem to generate circles of revenge. 
However, even if the criminal acts do not appear to lead to revenge acts of violence, several 
informants referred to “other ways” of revenge. These “other ways” would entail contacting 
someone with supernatural powers, and ask them to make the object ill or even kill them 
through cursing or poison. Leonardi (2013, 119) also observed the narrative that cursing and 
poison were means of revenge. As Leonardi’s (2013) observations indicate, the use of 
witchcraft is not a new concept in the area.  However, this continued inclination to turn to 
witchcraft as a replacement for justice through the justice system may be interpreted as a 
symptom of the same lack of confidence in the state’s ability to provide security and justice.  
4.4 Displacement and Return- a Source of Conflict 
When groups of people are displaced this may cause conflict as they are forced onto the 
territory of other groups. This causes heightened pressure on already meager resources and 
increased conflict over land. The return of refugees and internally displaced people may also 
have the same effect, especially when this happens after an extended period. Both these issues 
are central factors in creating increased instability in Yei River County.  
4.4.1 Returning to Host Displaced People 
As covered in the introduction, the wars, and particularly the second civil war, caused large 
numbers of South Sudanese to leave their homes seeking refuge. Especially in the urban areas 
civilians left the towns for “the bush” or neighbouring countries. After the “liberation” of Yei, 
many of the informants said that people not originally from Yei settled in the area. Upon the 
return of people originally from Yei the conflict between settlers and returnees became an 
issue in the community. One of my informants, an employee of Norwegian People’s Aid and 
not originally from Yei, told me that when Yei was “liberated” the people who were 
originally from the area were not there. They had either joined the SPLA or had run away 
from the fighting. After the area had become peaceful, the people from Yei returned, only to 
find someone else living in their home. The people who had settled were both soldiers from 
the SPLA and their families, as well as people displaced from other areas. This narrative is 
similar to the accounts presented by Bennett et al. (2010, 88) of displaced ethnic groups from 
other areas refusing to leave the Equatoria region, occupying territories. This created a 
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conflict between the returnees and the settlers, a conflict that according to my findings is still 
present today.  
As explained in the introduction, the establishment of Yei as the SPLM/A headquarter lead to 
an influx of people to the town, including a considerable military presence. After Yei became 
relatively peaceful following the  1997 “liberation” it became a safe haven for people 
displaced by the war raging in the rest of the South Sudan (Martin and Sluga 2011, 4–5). 
Moreover, the crisis that hit the country in December 2013 and the violent conflict that is still 
going on sent hordes of people fleeing the affected areas. Many of the internally displaced 
people are finding their way to the Yei area, and are settling with relatives who have been 
there since the last war. The return of the autochthonous Kakwa population added pressure on 
the Dinka, both IDPs and military personnel, that had immigrated (Martin and Sluga 2011, 5).   
The issue of returnees was identified by Bennett et.al. (2010) in their report on factors causing 
instability both right after the signing of the CPA and in 2009. They even found that the threat 
of return destabilising communities was greater in 2009 than in 2005. My findings suggest 
that six years later this is still a threat to the stability in the area. However, it presents itself in 
different ways across the county, with some areas more greatly affected than others. Based on 
my interviews it also appears that there is a significant difference in the impact on the 
community, depending on whether it is in a rural or urban area.  
Crowding the Town- the Migrant Population in Urban Areas 
In Yei town many of my informants pointed to the increased pressure on institutions such as 
schools. One of the informants was telling the story of how it was a race to arrive at the 
school in time to get a place for his children, and was blaming this shortage on too many 
children of migrant families taking up the places (Salah Edward 2015). In 2010, Martin and 
Sluga (2011, 20) found that the access to schools was a motivational factor in people choosing 
to remain in Yei rather than return to their home area. One of my informants brought up this 
topic/issue saying that people in other areas of the country sent their children to relatives in 
Yei because of the schools (Salah Edward 2015). As I did not interview any IDPs about this 
or had access to school records, I have no way of knowing if this is a common practice or 
simply an expression of frustration. However, it is worth considering that if it is the case that 
people are sending their children to the area this might also be connected to the security 
situation in other parts of the country. In a consultancy report commissioned by the World 
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Food Programme, Bailey and Harragin (2009, 15) found that refugees and internally displaced 
people delayed their return because of access to educational opportunities, as well as the 
security situation. With the worsening of the security situation in parts of South Sudan that we 
have witnessed over the last years, it is likely that this is an even stronger factor now than six 
years ago.  
Cattle and Conflict- Migration in the Rural Areas 
In the rural areas, the conflict between the host communities and the migrants and displaced 
people has varied greatly between the payams, and even between the bomas within the 
payams. In the areas bordering Western Equatoria pastoralists moving their cattle have caused 
major problems for the farmers. The pastoralists are forced to move because of drought and 
the violent conflict in their home areas. The conflict with the host communities is twofold; it 
is partly because of the cattle ruining the crops of the farmers and partly due to the cattle 
keepers being perceived as a threat to the communities. According to Bennett et al. (2010) 
this was not an pressing issue in 2005, but became a more serious threat around 2009, and 
according to my findings it appears to have become worse after the recent crisis. This 
contributes to an increased level of conflict in the communities.   
Many of the informants from Tore payam particularly complained about the pastoralists 
bringing their cattle, and the consequences this would have on the crops. A prominent resident 
of Tore payam described the problem as the cattle destroying the crops, leaving some families 
without food. He continued to explain that they had attempted to contact the cattle keepers to 
have them pay compensation, but they had refused. The point about the pastoralists refusing 
to pay compensation for the losses suffered by the farmers in the host community brings the 
other element of the conflict. Many of the informants in the areas affected by the pastoralists’ 
arrival described a sense of fear connected with the situation. As the cattle keepers are armed 
many perceive them as being more likely to use violence if confronted. A prominent member 
of the community in Tore payam also said that their presence contributed to the people in the 
community fearing that the current civil war might spread. The seeming inability of the state 
and the local authorities in handling these conflicts may serve to increase the incentive to use 
violence because there does not seem to exist a credible arena for conflict-resolution (Call and 
Cousens 2008, 9–10).  
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Both in the urban and rural areas of the county the considerable presence of migrants is 
affecting the society. In the aftermath of outbreak of the crisis there were reports of Dinka 
murdering Nuer in Yei, the killings took place in the night and were only discovered when the 
bodies were recovered the following day. Some complained that the perpetrators were not 
arrested, and a representative of an international NGO said that they claim the reason for this 
is that they are part of the “ruling group”. Bennett et al. (2010, 88) also reported complaints 
from the local communities that government or SPLA representatives protected people who 
took part in unlawful land grabbing and other crimes. These events are fuelling the tension in 
the area, and together with the heavy us-them rhetoric, it is contributing to a split between this 
region and the national level.   
4.5 We are not Like Them, the Rhetoric of Difference 
In 2009 Bennett et al. (2010, 43) identified a hardening of ethnic identities as one of the key 
challenges that needed to be faced in order to avoid escalation of conflict. During my 
fieldwork I observed ethnic tension, both in regards to the migrant population settled in Yei 
and the pastoralists who were displaced to the region and in regards to the rest of the 
population in the country. As mentioned above (pp. 13-14), Paris and Sisk (2009a) makes a 
clear distinction between the concepts of statebuilding and nationbuilding, stating that 
nationbuilding deals with the collective identity of the nation’s population. However, the 
challenges concerning a lack of collective identity still needs to be discussed, as it is affecting 
the level of trust the population has in the government because it is seen to be dominated by 
some ethnic groups.  
The migrant communities in Yei appear to be secluded from the host community in many 
aspects of life. One informant explained that most of these communities, both the South 
Sudanese from other areas of the country and the foreigners, have their own areas and own 
congregations (Raphael Sabun 2015). Walking around Yei Town, I could observe that people 
from the external communities, both from other countries and other parts of South Sudan, 
often stuck together.  
The conflict between the displaced people settled in Yei and the host community have taken 
on an ethnic dimension, and a discourse of being different from the other people of South 
Sudan dominated. A great deal of the people I interviewed made clear statements that they 
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view the autochthonous population of Yei River County, as different and better than many of 
the other ethnic groups or tribes in the country. Especially the Kakwa – an ethnic group native 
to the border areas between DR Congo, Uganda and South Sudan, including the greater Yei 
area – voiced this perspective. The section above on trust in the justice system touched upon 
the narrative that the people I talked to viewed it as a trait of their ethnic group to refrain from 
the use of violence, but it is also important for this section. Following the description of 
themselves as non-violent was the description of other groups as violent, and a rhetoric of 
difference. Many of the informants distanced themselves from the current civil war, stating 
that it is not their conflict. During one of my interviews, a group of young men came over to 
greet the informant, after which he informed me that they were deserted soldiers stating that 
“These soldiers left the army because the war has become a tribal war, so they left” (Manoah 
Aligo 2015). In informal conversations I had, the crisis often became a subject, and people 
expressed great frustration over the leadership of the country and the lack of real 
representation of the Equatoria region. People often referred to it as being between the two 
leaders, Salva Kiir and Riek Machar and their personal conflict.  
In the continuation of the perception of the crisis as being someone else’s doing, and not 
something they identified with was the notion of the people of this region being different from 
the others. When discussing the crisis most of the respondents were clear that most of the 
consequences they were suffering from the crisis was related to the internally displaced 
persons staying in their community, and not their own part in the crisis. Especially the before 
mentioned challenges with the cattle keepers came up in these conversations. They were 
described as being different from the people originating from the area, and many 
communicated a perception of them being unreliable and unwilling to adjust to the 
community. This corresponds with the findings of Martin and Sluga (2011, 11) of the 
willingness to blame the increase in crime on the Dinka population. 
The Dinka is an agro-pastoralist people consisting of several sub-groups. They have 
traditionally been found on different sides both politically and militarily. The current 
president, Salva Kiir Myardit is Dinka (Johnson 2014, 300). In the 1983 census the Dinka 
accounted for approximately one third of the population of  the South (Johnson 2003, 51–53). 
Marginalised elites portray the Dinka as being in a privileged position in the state apparatus, 
and claim that strengthening this apparatus may be perceived as strengthening the position of 
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the Dinka. This is of particular importance for this thesis as the Dinka, originate from a 
different region than Equatoria, but are still present with a considerable number in Yei. 
This rhetoric of difference was also noticeable in the street scene in Yei town and in informal 
conversations. In 2010, Martin and Sluga (2011, 11) observed that there were heavy ethnic 
tensions, and even open harassment of Dinka and refugees from DR Congo. I did not observe 
any open harassment as such, but on numerous occasions, I witnessed acts by Kakwa aimed at 
distancing themselves from Dinka. One such example was when I spent an afternoon in a hair 
salon and I noticed that the Kakwa women switched to speaking Kakwa when some Dinka 
women entered. The woman I went there with turned to me and whispered, “you see those 
women, they are Dinka” as an explanation as to why it would be best to avoid them. The wish 
to alienate the others, as well as assigning them with certain traits based on their ethnicity was 
common. This is relevant to the question of the state as the narrative of the state being closely 
linked to the Dinka, as discussed in the theoretical framework, also links the negative view of 
the Dinka to a negative view of the state.     
4.6 Summary 
The findings discussed in this chapter indicates that Yei River County is not a success-story 
of statebuilding, rather the opposite. In the first section I presented the system of local 
governance according to the Local Government Act of 2009 (Government 2009). My findings 
show a heavy discontent with the creation of the municipality in Yei town. This indicated that 
both the process of establishing it, as well as the ability of the state to implement reform is 
limited. Part of the resistance to reform came from chiefs in the area, and when I continued to 
examine the role of traditional authority, I found that confusion around roles prevailed in 
many areas. The boma chiefs, who are supposed to be the main authority at the boma level, 
instead found themselves in a squeeze between the authorities above and the community 
below. Their position is further pressured because of the expectation that they would generate 
their own income through taxes and fines, while feeling responsible for their community. 
While the boma chiefs had less power than stipulated by the Local Government Act, I found 
that the elders constituted a strong authority that was not recognised in the act. This also 
supports the indication that the state has limited ability to implement reform.  
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Further, I found that the state failed in providing security for its citizens, particularly in the 
peripheral areas. Together with the lapse in the justice system that created a perception of 
prevailing injustice, this impairs people’s trust in the judiciary and the state. I did however not 
find that people were inclined to take matters into their own hands through violent revenge, 
with the exception of minor fights. This disposition may be seen as playing a part in the 
relative stability of the region in spite of the issues covered.  
The high numbers of displaced people based in Yei appear to be a significant source of 
frustration for the local population. In the urban areas of Yei town this conflict was linked to 
the struggle for resources and services such as schools, but also took on an ethnic dimension. 
In the rural areas, the displaced pastoralists and their cattle created problems for their host 
communities. The conflict between the displaced people settled in Yei and the host 
community have taken on an ethnic dimension and a discourse of being different from the 
other people of South Sudan dominated. This was also present in the narrative about the 
national leadership of the country, illustrating their identity as peripheral to the centre in the 
capital. The consequences of these findings will be discussed further below. 
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5 Conclusion 
Despite being better suited for it than most other areas in the country, the implementation of 
statebuilding in Yei River County appears not to have been successful. My findings presented 
in this thesis indicate that not much progress has been made since the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement in 2005, or indeed the independence in 2011. However, as this is a single case 
study it is not possible to conclude that the implementation of statebuilding in all the 
peripheries in South Sudan has failed based only on the findings in my study. However, as 
this is a crucial case study, as discussed in chapter 3, it may provide us with valuable insight 
despite being a single case study. In the following, I will discuss the consequences of my 
findings and recommend further research activities based on them.  
5.1 The Significance of the Findings 
There appears to be a lack of knowledge about the system of local governance among both the 
stakeholders and the community, and with legal texts not having been translated to local 
languages this makes this situation all the more challenging. This should be seen in relation to 
the centralisation of power, where power is moved from the lower levels of local governance 
to the higher levels. Together these elements limit the ability of the non-elite stakeholders in 
the peripheral areas to voice their opinions. Having a negative effect on local ownership, the 
need for local knowledge is apparent, as discussed by Autesserre (2014). My findings further 
indicated that the bomas experienced different challenges in different areas of the county, 
which supports the call for local knowledge. Even in cases where the bomas were quite close 
geographically the variations were noteworthy. This supports Scott's (1998) argument against 
universalisation, the different challenges may need different measures to be taken.    
Following the discussion of local ownership, my findings indicate that the state is failing to 
establish economic ties with the community, this in congruence with what Tvedt (1994) found 
in the wake of the Addis Ababa agreement. The lack of service provision in the peripheries 
makes it difficult for the boma chiefs to collect taxes since the community experiences no 
reciprocity following their contribution. This seemingly fragile relationship between the state 
and the community places this case within the framework of Moore describing how this 
weakens accountability, an important feature of a functioning state.  
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Several of my informants expressed that the apparent failure of statebuilding at the local level 
had a negative impact on their trust in the state at the central level. This indicates that there is 
a connection between the failure to implement statebuilding at the local and at the central 
level. Even though such a conclusion is dependent on further research, it serves as an 
indication that the peripheries require more attention, both by researchers and stakeholders 
involved in statebuilding efforts. When this attention does not seem to be given it may be a 
result of several factors. As discussed in the theoretical framework, peacebuilding and 
statebuilding operations are often expected to be concluded within a limited time-frame. This 
places restrictions on the ability to reach the periphery in areas with limited infrastructure, 
making it difficult to pay sufficient attention to the periphery. In addition, I experienced that 
the language barrier complicated contact with the most remote communities, thus slowing 
down the process even further.  
5.2 Other Factors 
Corroborating existing literature, the findings of this thesis indicate that statebuilding 
operations in the periphery are facing serious challenges, which may lead to renewed conflict. 
However, my finding that people in Yei River District appeared reluctant to turn to violent 
conflict contests the theoretical framework on the connection between failure in statebuilding 
and renewed conflict. Despite this communicated reluctance to violence, I also found several 
informants indicating that the non-violent line would not last indefinitely if they did not see 
improvements. Consequently, we should not treat the current state of relative peace in Yei 
River County as a permanent state.  
The apparent tendency to adapt the system of local governance to fill the gap where the state 
was failing may have contributed to counter the consequences of the failure to implement 
statebuilding. As an example, we may view the strong position of elders in Yei River District 
as limiting factor to the risk of youths turning to violence. This contradicts the finding by 
Bennett et al. (2010) that the weakened position of elders contributed to more violence by 
youths as I found that this position was not significantly weakened. It is also possible that 
some of the factors that provided Yei River County with a good basis for statebuilding also 
contributed to reducing the potential for violent conflict when the implementation of 
statebuilding failed.  
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I will therefore argue that we need more information in order to make a clear conclusion in 
the matter of the relationship between failed statebuilding and conflict, a matter that will be 
discussed further in the continuation.    
5.3 Further Research 
We need better insight into perspectives of the communities in Yei River County in order to 
understand better why statebuilding seems to have failed when the conditions appeared 
favourable. I have not performed an in-depth analysis of the efforts made to implement 
statebuilding, only the level of success. Assessment of projects aimed at implementing 
statebuilding and building capacity among stakeholders in local governance and the 
communities would be useful. The findings in this study indicate that the capacity among the 
stakeholders and communities to implement statebuilding is inadequate, and it would 
therefore be useful to know more about the efforts made in capacity building. It would also be 
of value to identify participants in workshops and other capacity-building projects and 
compare their perspectives to the ones of stakeholders who had not attended such arenas. My 
study focused on the local elites as stakeholders in the system of local governance, and even 
though efforts were made to access the perspectives of community members, the information 
gathered was limited. A study that focuses more on the perspective of people with lower 
status would also contribute to an understanding of why the failure of the implementation of 
statebuilding in the area has not led to violent conflict. Such an assessment would contribute 
to shedding light on whether the reason for this apparent failure is a lack of priority to the 
peripheries, as indicated by the contributions of Kappler (2013 and Autesserre (2014) in the 
theoretical framework.   
A case study of other peripheries of South Sudan would be useful to get an overall insight into 
the implementation of statebuilding in the peripheries. As a qualitative case study, this study 
has a weakness in terms of generalisation, but as a crucial case, it has provided insight into the 
implementation of statebuilding in a favourable case. To complement the findings of this 
study and help identify features that may be generalised, I recommend a case study of one of 
the areas currently suffering civil war, e.g. Jonglei, Upper Nile or Unity state. That would 
constitute a crucial case study at the other end of the spectrum from mine and could provide a 
useful contrast as the areas have less favourable conditions and a different outcome than this 
case.   
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Similar to my study, a case study of any of the three areas should include an assessment of 
peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts, as well as data collected from members of the 
communities. Comparing the findings from my study with such a case study would contribute 
to a foundation for generalisation. By comparing two cases in that way makes it easier to 
identify the differences and similarities leading up to the different outcome, and as such 
giving better grounds for generalisation.   
5.4 The Bumpy Road Ahead 
As this thesis shows, much remains to be learned about the undoubtedly challenging task of 
building a South Sudanese state. However, it also indicates that the successful building of the 
state requires a substantial focus on the lower levels of governance. The South Sudanese state 
is today a peripheral state, even when considering the better positioned of the peripheries. 
With South Sudan facing its third civil war and a devastating economic crisis, the failure to 
implement statebuilding in the peripheries may prove the last straw, making the dream of a 
peaceful South Sudan just that, a dream.  
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Appendix List of Interviews 
Name Position Date of interview Place of interview 
Abraham Agok Chan   NGO employee 
living in Yei for 
ten years 
21.01.2015 Yei town 
Abui Hillary Gabriel Boma chief 
Ombasi  
12.02.2015 Ombasi boma 
Allison Aligo Office clerk 
Mugwo payam 
office 
05.02.2015 Mugwo payam 
Anthony Amede Head chief Tore 04.02.2015 Tore payam 
Anthony Diko Monyemenu 29.01.2015 Yei town 
Augustine Lubari Beljemi Payam director 
Mugwo 
05.02.2015 Mugwo payam 
Azariah Khamis Noah Payam director 
Tore 
04.02.2015 Tore payam 
Bakata Charles Community 
member with 
overview of the 
political situation   
10.02.2015 Yei town 
Confucius Guya Sartiek Elder 12.02.2015 Mungo boma 
David Bala Director at Yei 
Crop Training 
Centre 
29.01.2015 Yei town 
David Lomoro Youth in the 
community 
13.02.2015 Tukuri boma 
David Roger Michael Deputy payam 
director Otogo 
12.02.2015 Otogo payam 
Dr. Alfred Sebit Lokuji Academic 
specialised in 
good governance 
and development 
in East Africa 
12.01.2015 Juba University 
Felix Lumori John Chairman 
committee of 
development Lasu 
payam 
06.02.2015 Lasu payam 
Fraser Joseph Lokule NGO employee 
from Yei 
21.01.2015 Yei town 
Group interview: Steven 
Wongo, Ajume Alex, Isac 
Bida and Isac Taban 
Group of youth 
leaders in Lasu 
payam 
06.02.2015 Lasu payam 
Group interview: Michael 
Khamis Majeipi, Roze 
Franco Twasa and Angelina 
Potuma 
Senior head man, 
community 
member and 
community 
member 
13.02.2015 Mapoko boma 
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Group of women * Group of women 
in the community 
05.02.2015 Mugwo payam 
Jane Tumaka Saima Chair lady of 
Asole boma 
06.02.2015 Asole boma 
John Ponsiano Loro Block director Yei 
municipality 
22.01.2015 Yei town 
John Thomas Boma chief Asole 06.02.2015 Asole boma 
John Yuma Jacob Head man 21.01.2015 Yei town 
Joseph Brown Lo-Mose Head chief 
Mugwo 
05.02.2015 Mugwo payam 
Joseph Lugala Esayah Elder 05.02.2015 Logamera boma 
Joseph Mandi Elder 05.02.2015 Logamera boma 
Justin Modi Matiya Head chief Lasu 06.02.2015 Lasu payam 
Justin Muhamed Murusaleh Boma chief 
Rasual  
04.02.2015 Tore payam 
Justin Towongo James Head chief Otogo 12.02.2015 Otogo payam 
Kristi Mudi Ambros   Women 
representative in 
Mugwo Payam 
Court 
05.02.2015 Mugwo payam 
Lubari Ramba Lokolo Community 
member with 
overview of the 
political situation   
06.02.2015 Yei town 
Maliamunku Bosco Robert Secretary General 
Yei Municipality 
Chamber of 
Commerce  
21.01.2015 Yei town 
Manoah Aligo Academic 
returned to Yei 
and community 
member 
05.02.2015 Mugwo-Yei road 
Marcelina Konga Seja Chair lady of Lasu 
payam 
06.02.2015 Lasu payam 
Paul Ondongo Manya Boma chief 
Mundu 
04.02.2015 Tore payam 
Peter Hakim Justin Academic 
specialised in 
traditional 
authority in 
Equatoria  
15.01.2015 PAX office in Juba 
Peter Sayed Murusaleh Head chief Yei 05.02.2015 Yei town 
Raphael Sabun NGO employee 
living in Yei 
27.01.2015 Yei town 
Richard Lugala God Office manager at 
the County 
Commissioner’s 
Office 
06.02.2015 Yei town 
Salah Edward NGO employee 
living in Yei  
27.01.2015 Logobero 
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Samuel Aminga Mangora Sub chief acting 
as boma chief 
Mungo  
12.02.2015 Mungo boma 
Simon Akasha Abraham Boma chief 
Logamera 
05.02.2015 Mugwo payam 
Simon Logoro Abui Lupe Boma chief 
Tukuri 
13.02.2015 Tukuri boma 
 
*The interviewees wished to remain anonymous.   
